VOLUME VI, ISSUE I & II, SPRING & FALL 2013
Abstract
The concept of human dignity is central in many constitutions world-wide. It plays a particularly central role in the German foundational law. Kant’s concept of dignity is particularly influential in this context. There are two aspects that German law inherited from Kant and both of which are highly problematic. Firstly, even though it is acknowledged by the German constitution that animals are not objects, they are supposed to be treated like objects. Hence, the categorical dualistic separation of animals from human beings is implicitly contained in this judgment. Secondly, it is legally forbidden to treat a person solely as a means. This insight applies both to oneself as well as to other persons, which becomes clear in the following two regulations. Firstly, peep shows in Germany are legally forbidden, even if it is the case that it is the dancer’s autonomous wish to earn money in that way. Secondly, it is forbidden to shoot down a hijacked airplane, even though it seems to fly directly into a nuclear power station, as long as there are innocent persons on board. In both cases, the regulation was justified by reference to the Kantian thought that it is morally false to treat a person solely as a means. In the following reflections, firstly, I will question a basic assumption on which this regulation rests; secondly, I will consider which options follow from these reflections; and thirdly I will analyze the challenges related to the options mentioned. Thereby, it is supposed to become clear that the German law needs to be altered concerning the moral prohibition of treating a person solely as a means.
The concept of human dignity is central in many international constitutions.. It plays a particularly central role in the German foundational law (Sorgner 2010, 23-29). Kant’s concept of dignity is particularly influential in this context (Sorgner 2010, 82-108). There are two aspects which German law inherited from Kant and both of which are highly problematic. Firstly, even though that it is acknowledged by the German constitution that animals are not objects, they are supposed to be treated like objects. Hence, the categorical dualistic separation of animals from human beings is implicitly contained in this judgment. Secondly, it is legally forbidden to treat a person solely as a means. This insight applies both to oneself as well as to other persons, which becomes clear in the following two regulations. Firstly, peep shows in Germany are legally forbidden, even if it is the case that it is the dancer’s autonomous wish to earn money in that way (Welti 2005, 397). Secondly, it is forbidden to shoot down a hijacked airplane, even though it seems to fly directly into a nuclear power station, as long as there are innocent persons on board (BVerfG, 1 BvR 357/05 from the 15.2.2006). In both cases, the regulation was justified by reference to the Kantian thought that it is morally false to treat a person solely as a means. In the following reflections, firstly, I will question a basic assumption on which this regulation rests, secondly, I will consider which options follow from these reflections and thirdly I will analyze the challenges related to the options mentioned. Thereby, it is supposed to become clear that the German law needs to be altered concerning the moral prohibition of treating a person solely as a means.
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