

Nietzsche on Moods, Passions, and Styles: Greek Inspirations

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Seid von mir begrüßt, liebe Stimmungen, wundersame Wechseleiner stürmischen Seele, mannichfach wie die Natur ist, aber großartiger als die Natur ist... Ich bin in diesem Augenblick nicht mehr so gestimmt, wie ich es beim Beginn des Schreibens.

Dear moods, I salute you, marvellous variations of a tempestuous soul, as manifold as nature itself, but more magnificent than nature... I am no longer this moment in the mood I was in as I began to write.

—Nietzsche, “Über Stimmungen” (1864)

I.

Throughout his works, despite all changes, Nietzsche remains dedicated to the belief that the affective realm—the entire sphere of moods, passions, emotions, feelings—lies far deeper than reason and provides the real motivation for our pursuit of knowledge, ethics, and art. But Nietzsche avoids a simple binary opposition of “emotion versus reason” and instead suggests that our drive for knowledge itself has an affective origin in our psychology. The early Nietzsche frequently uses the term “the pathos of truth [*Pathos der Wahrheit*]” to suggest that even our striving for truth arises from an affective

need. This position has ancient origins: the Greek meaning of *philo-sophia* as love for wisdom suggests an affective heart, a particular kind of love, as the root meaning of philosophy. One reason for Nietzsche’s love of the Greeks lies in this ancient sense of philosophy as a kind of love and as a way of life. Indeed, Nietzsche’s revaluations of moods and passions arise from his readings of the Greeks. Only through his revivals of the Greeks, I argue, does Nietzsche find the resources he needs to develop an alternative understanding of affects that differs from both Christianity and modern pessimism.¹

Granted, Nietzsche does not have a single “theory of the emotions” in the contemporary analytic sense. Rather, Nietzsche’s understanding of our affective life evolves. In his unique way, Nietzsche not only analyzes moods and passions, but evokes them rhetorically, arouses and guides the emotional responses of his readers. At times within one work, even within one paragraph, Nietzsche’s writing moves from one mood to another and influences the reader differently. The question of mood thus proves to be inseparable from the question of style. Nietzsche deliberately engages in a wide range of styles of writing, by shifting voices and by experimenting with genres, to show his perspectivism and to open each reader’s perspectives.² Thus a range of styles communicates a range of moods, ways of thinking and feeling.

In this study, I trace the development from mood to passion, from *Stimmung* to *Leidenschaft*, across early to middle works. In one of his earliest essays, titled “On Moods” from 1864, the young Nietzsche explores the amorphous, atmospheric, ever-changing nature of moods. In this rich essay, which has not yet received much critical attention, Nietzsche writes under the influence of Romanticism, but several statements anticipate his mature ideas.

¹For more of my work on Nietzsche and the Greeks, see my articles (Woodruff 2002a, 2002b, 2007). For more of my work on Nietzsche’s styles, see my article on animals and styles (Woodruff 2004).

²Here I follow Alexander Nehamas: Nietzsche seeks to demonstrate his perspectivism through “his adoption of a vast, and so far largely unnoticed variety of literary genres and styles: his purpose is in this way to make his presence as an individual author unforgettable to his readers” (4-5).

While certain philosophers have ignored or disparaged moods as less important than emotions, because the former appear to lack a concrete object, Nietzsche shows the unique significance of *Stimmung* and inaugurates a tradition of thought. Then, in his lectures of the early 1870s on the Pre-Socratics, Nietzsche turns his attention to the moods and ways of life of these early thinkers. In *Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche focuses on the contrast between the moods of Apollonian calm self-restraint and those of Dionysian ecstatic self-loss, and more generally on the healing emotions of tragedy.

In the middle works, Nietzsche continues his interest in moods but shifts the focus to the psychology of self-liberation for the future. In the trio of works on “free spirits,” *Human, All Too Human*, *Daybreak*, and *Gay Science*, Nietzsche now includes passions (*Leidenschaften*), emphasizes the contrast between Greek and Christian evaluations of affects, and stresses the need for different moods for doing philosophy as the “joyous wisdom.” Finally, in later works, Nietzsche examines affects historically and linguistically: how do emotions depend on the changing values given to them by language, religion, and culture? While the late Nietzsche ceases to write of *Stimmung*, for reasons we shall explore, he maintains his core belief in the pivotal role of passions, drives, and feelings.

For three main reasons, we will benefit from studying Nietzsche on moods and passions. First, tracing this development helps us to understand the evolution of Nietzsche’s thought more generally, especially his psychological insights into creativity and morality. Second, it helps us to appreciate Nietzsche’s inheritance from the Greeks and his influence on major thinkers of the Twentieth Century. For instance, consider the philosophical role of moods in Existentialism, from nausea as discussed by Sartre, to the absurd as examined by Camus, to the existential anxiety as emphasized by Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Third, if we wish to understand public moods today, especially the political mood of resentment, we need to learn from Nietzsche’s richly nuanced discussions, informed by his readings of Greek classics.

II.

In the early essay “On Moods” from Spring 1864, Nietzsche, only 19 and still at Schulpforta, writes under the influence of Romanticism.³ Beginning his life-long characteristic approach, Nietzsche both explores the philosophical significance of moods and arouses moods for the reader: “I am writing about moods, insofar as I am right now in a certain mood; and it is fortunate that I am just in the mood for describing moods” (NR 21). The writing moves from one mood to another by evoking seasonal changes. After first naming Easter (“A fine rain is falling outside”), the essay moves to another season: “Mild summer evening, twilight streaked with pallor. Children’s voices in the lanes, in the distance noise and music” (NR 22). Then the essay concludes with dramatic lines that call to mind the style of *Sturm und Drang*: “Storm and rain! Thunder and lightning! Right through the middle! And a voice rang out: ‘Become new!’” (NR 23).⁴

Moods for the early Nietzsche involve opposition: “our temperament is conditioned by these old and new worlds, and the current situation of the conflict is what we call ‘mood’ [*Stimmung*] or also, with some disdain, ‘temper’ [*Laune*]” (NR 21). These “quarreling parties” represent our ever-changing moods. Such emotional strife actually benefits us: “conflict is the constant nourishment of the soul” (NR 22). Continuing his interests from “Homer’s Contest,” Nietzsche valorizes strife in the Greek tradition of *agon*, noble competition.⁵

To elaborate this positive view of psychological strife, Nietzsche revives the Platonic metaphor of the soul as a city with conflicting parts:

³As Stanley Corngold notes, the young Nietzsche is especially influenced by the moods of Hölderlin’s poetry (68-69).

⁴As Graham Parkes notes, this essay brings to mind “radical hylozoism, or panpsychism,” a continuum between human and organic spheres (48). Parkes further explores Emerson’s influence on this early essay (42-48).

⁵For more on Nietzsche and Greek agonistics, see Christa Davis Acampora’s *Contesting Nietzsche* (2013).

Moods thus arise either from inner conflict or else from external pressure on the inner world. Here there is a civil war between two enemy camps, there an oppression of populace by a particular class, by a small minority... The soul destroys and thereby gives birth to new things, it fights energetically, and yet gently draws the opponent over to its own side for an intimate union (NR 22).

While Nietzsche does not name Plato's *Republic* here, he was already immersed in the study of Greek classics and would have known Plato's political metaphor for the soul. Following the Platonic idea of soul as microcosm, Nietzsche explores the way *Stimmung* can be both internal and external, both emotional climate and public atmosphere.⁶

Here and elsewhere, Nietzsche celebrates the musical connotations of *Stimmung* as "attunement."⁷In German, *Stimmung* has significant musical and aural cognates, such as *Stimme* (voice), *stimmen* (to tune), *Übereinstimmung* (agreement, concord), and *Stimmgabel* (tuning fork, as in *Twilight of the Idols*). In this essay, Nietzsche mentions that he has played Liszt's *Consolations* many times: "now I feel how its tones have penetrated my being and continue, spiritualized, to resonate within me" (NR 21). Similar to the reverberations of music, moods linger and create harmony or disharmony in the soul. To evoke a certain mood, Nietzsche exclaims: "Listen! Music!" (NR 21). This early essay contains important terms, such as *Trieb* (drive) and *Macht des Willens* (power of will), and anticipates mature ideas, such as self-overcoming.

⁶This view anticipates Heidegger's: "A mood [*Stimmung*] assails us. It comes neither from 'outside' nor from 'inside' but arises out of Being-in-the-world" (*Being and Time* §29).

⁷For a history of the word and concept of *Stimmung*, see Leo Spitzer's *Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony* (1963). On music, see Georges Liébert, *Nietzsche And Music* (2004).

III.

In the early 1870s, Nietzsche continues his interest in *Stimmung*, intensifies the focus on the Greeks, and adds a historical dimension to the study of affects. In *Birth of Tragedy* (1872), Nietzsche makes the philosophical role of mood central to the contrast between Apollo and Dionysus: the former has a mood of "measured restraint, freedom from the wilder emotions, calm of the sculptor god" (BT §1). By contrast, the Dionysian polarity has a mood of wild excess and *ek-stasis*, as "standing outside oneself." Individuals lose their boundaries in the "mysterious primal unity" (BT §1). Even when Nietzsche does not explicitly use the term *Stimmung*, he focuses on the healing powers of moods and emotions in tragic art.

Nietzsche first mentions *Stimmung* by referring to Schiller's belief that lyric poetry grows out of a "musical mood" (BT §5). Schopenhauer's theory of music provides the essential background: "Hence it has always been said that music is the language of feeling and of passion, just as words are the language of reason" (WWR §52). Schopenhauer's metaphysics of music influences Nietzsche's belief that music reveals the deepest levels of reality and arouses passionate responses: "Dionysian music in particular excited awe and terror [*Schrecken und Grausen*]" (BT §2). Yet early Nietzsche still needs to overcome Schopenhauer's pessimism.

The second mention of *Stimmung* occurs as part of the effort to avoid this danger. When spectators turn from the emotive force of Greek tragedy back to ordinary life, they encounter a "chasm of oblivion" between the tragic and the mundane. The result is "nausea, an ascetic, will-negating mood" (BT §7). On this early view, Schopenhauer's pessimism represents the risk of modern nihilism, for which Greek tragedy presents the cure. After introducing the mood of nausea (which Sartre will develop as an existential affect), Nietzsche suggests the remedy: "Here, when the danger to [the] will is greatest, art approaches as a saving sorceress, expert at healing" (BT §7). Art transforms our responses to suffering: the sublime works as "the artistic taming of the horrible," while the comic represents "the artistic discharge of the nausea of

absurdity” (BT §7). Both the sublime and the comic offer to heal suffering through transformations of moods.

In the next section, Nietzsche again discusses *Stimmung*, this time that of the spectators of tragedy: “Now the dithyrambic chorus was assigned the task of exciting the mood of the listeners to such a Dionysian degree that, when the tragic hero appeared on the stage, they did not see the awkwardly masked human being but rather a visionary figure, born as it were from their own rapture” (BT §8). Lastly, regarding Nietzsche’s view that Euripides, under the influence of Socratic rationalism, replaced Dionysian ecstasies with “fiery affects” (BT §12), we should note that *Affekt* has a slightly negative connotation as a more technical term than *Stimmung*.

In *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* (1873), Nietzsche opens the essay by asserting that the lives, personalities, and moods of the Pre-Socratics matter more than their arguments alone: “whoever rejoices in great human beings will also rejoice in philosophical systems, even if completely erroneous. They always have one wholly incontrovertible point: personal mood, color” (PTA, Preface). Here Nietzsche differs from a dominant tradition of modern analytic philosophy that stresses arguments alone. Instead, Nietzsche introduces the theme of *philosophy as a way of life*, which becomes an influential way of interpreting Greco-Roman thought for Foucault, Hadot, and others. When Nietzsche writes of the *Stimmung* of these earliest Greek thinkers, he does not mean to reduce their thinking to “mere” psychology but rather to situate it in an individual and cultural attunement to the world, in a way of Being-in-the-world, in the Heideggerian phrase. The fact that these Pre-Socratic thinkers lived in unique ways, from the secretive community of the Pythagoreans to the reclusive Heraclitus, demonstrates that they lived their philosophy as “great individual human beings” and as part of “the republic of creative minds” (PTA Preface 1). The ultimate test of philosophical positions lies not in abstractions but in the lives of the philosophers. One

vivid statement summarizes the point: “The philosopher’s product is his *life*—That is his work of art” (*Writings from Early Notebooks*, 182).⁸

IV.

In the trio of works from his middle period, *Human, All Too Human* (1878-80), *Daybreak* (1881), and *Gay Science* (1882), Nietzsche expands his interest from *Stimmung* to *Leidenschaft*. These middle works introduce moods of radical questioning and uncertainty about old truths and old religions, yet also joy at new possibilities for thinking and living.⁹ Nietzsche continues to focus on *Stimmung* but for different purposes: for the development of “free spirits,” for the future of self-liberation and self-knowledge, and for the sake of diverse styles and genres for writing philosophy. From new moods and passions emerge new modes of writing and thinking. Style communicates mood.

In “The Wanderer and His Shadow,” the sequel to *Human, All Too Human*, in a pivotal section titled “A kind of cult of the passions,” Nietzsche urges the reader to transform passions:

It was up to you, and it is up to us, *to take from* the passions their terrible character and thus prevent their becoming devastating torrents... let us rather work together on the task of transforming the passions [*Leidenschaften*] of mankind one and all into joys [*Freudenschaften*] (WS, HH §37).

Here Nietzsche coins a clever term by substituting the word for pleasure, *Freude*, for the word for suffering, *Leiden*, which normally forms the first half of the word *Leidenschaft*. In a similar way, the Greek verb *paschein* means “to suffer” and is closely related to *pathos* and, via Latin *passio*, to the word “passion.” Etymologically, these terms remind us that we *suffer* the passions.

⁸For this passage, I acknowledge Graham Parkes (99).

⁹On this point, I agree with Sampsa Saarinen: “From *HH* onwards, Nietzsche seeks to communicate a philosophical mood, a mood conducive to living a philosophical life that unites skepticism with joy” (241).

But Nietzsche here and elsewhere (specifically in *WS*, *HH* §§53, 65, 88) implores readers to transform passions, to change sufferings into joys. Neither repression nor explosion of passions would be the goal for those “free spirits” who seek deeper self-knowledge.

Self-transformation through passions promises a distinctive style of both character and writing. Style in the broadest sense means a way of thinking and communicating one’s unique *ethos*, character. Style, far from being merely decorative, thus takes on an ethical significance. Nietzsche argues that the best style communicates the best character: “that of the spiritually joyful, luminous and honest man who has overcome his passions. This will be the teaching that there exists a best style: the style corresponding to the good man” (*WS*, *HH* §88). Further, style can acquire political significance, as Nietzsche advocates a new ideal of a cosmopolitan communication: “That is why everyone who is a good European now has to learn *to write well and ever better*... To write better, however, means at the same time also to think better” (*WS*, *HH* §87). The phrase “good European” indicates a cross-cultural openness in thinking and writing, a style open to diverse traditions and against narrow parochialism.¹⁰

In *Daybreak*, Nietzsche continues to explore the connections between thinking and feeling, to contrast ancient and modern modes of experiencing emotions, and to revive Greek passions as antidotes to the dangers of both Christian “otherworldliness” and Schopenhauer’s pessimism. For instance, this passage makes an explicit contrast: “The passions become evil and malicious if they are regarded as evil and malicious. Thus Christianity has succeeded in transforming Eros and Aphrodite—great powers capable of idealization—into diabolical kobolds and phantoms” (*D* §76). In two other key sections, Nietzsche stresses the joy that Greek thinkers found in the search for knowledge: one should “hear the continual rejoicing which resounds through every speech and counter-speech of a Platonic dialogue”

¹⁰As David Krell writes, Nietzsche became “one of the principal critics of European (and especially German) nationalism, imperialism, and militarism” (*The Good European*, 1).

(*D* §544). Indeed, the Greek love of argument was so passionate that it could even blur the distinction between Apollonian and Dionysian: “In those days, souls were filled with drunkenness at the rigorous and sober game of concept, generalization, refutation, limitation” (*D* §544).

Further, Plato and Aristotle, “as fundamentally different” as they were, agreed that “what constituted *supreme happiness*,” not only for humans but for the gods, lay in the pursuit of knowledge, “in the activity of a well-trained inquisitive and inventive *mind*” (*D* §550). As in *Birth of Tragedy*, so too in this work Nietzsche critiques his own age by a revival of Greek passions and beliefs, especially their reverence for sexuality and fertility, and their joy in seeking knowledge.

On the history of morality, Nietzsche asserts: “we have to *learn to think differently*—in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: *to feel differently*” (*D* §103). Again, this mode of thought seeks to destabilize the dichotomy between thinking and feeling. Finally, Nietzsche warns that the excessive intellectual passion of his age might be risky: “Knowledge has in us been transformed into a passion... Perhaps mankind will even perish of this passion for knowledge!” (*D* §429). Philosophy on this view, far from being only abstract and logical, contains such strong passions that they might become dangerous, if not transformed and guided towards life.

V.

The *Gay Science* seeks new moods and styles for doing philosophy and for cultivating the humanity of the future.¹¹ Nietzsche opens this work by writing of the need for “the saturnalia of spirit” and “the hope for health, and the intoxication of convalescence” (*GS* Preface §1). The shift in content, to a liberating “alliance” between wisdom with laughter (*GS* §1), demands a shift in the moods and styles of Nietzsche’s own writing and correspondingly of

¹¹As Kathleen Higgins puts it, this work is “carefully orchestrated” and draws on elements of music, drama, and comedy (8).

each reader's moods and styles. Rather than the traditional pursuit of "truth at any price," Nietzsche asserts that what we truly need is life, more than truth:

The problem of the total health of a people, time, race or of humanity... what was at stake in all philosophizing hitherto was not at all "truth" but something else—let us say, health, future, growth, power, life (GS Preface §2).

Thus, Nietzsche casts himself in the role of "philosophical physician," an important idea from early essays, to diagnose the hidden ailments and needs of a culture: there can often lurk "an unconscious disguise of physiological needs under the cloak of the objective, ideal, purely spiritual" (GS Preface §2). In fact, Nietzsche poses the question of whether most previous philosophy has been "an interpretation of the body and a *misunderstanding of the body*" (GS Preface §2). To understand human beings deeply, we must engage in the careful examination of all affects as embodied and as evolving, incorporating biology, psychology, medicine, philology, and history into philosophy—that is, the method of a Nietzschean genealogy, well before the *Genealogy*.

Passions have their own history. Nietzsche contrasts Greek and early Christian views of the passions: the Greeks "loved, elevated, gilded, and deified" the passions (GS §139). As noted, recall that Eros, Aphrodite, and Dionysus were divinities worthy of reverence for the Greeks; hence human erotic desire had a divine source. By contrast, Nietzsche asserts that St. Paul and others interpret the passions as "dirty, disfiguring, and heartbreaking" and even aim for "the annihilation of the passions" (GS §139). Therefore, the revaluation of passions and moods will be essential to any new philosophical, religious, or artistic movement.

In "Elevated Moods [*Hohe Stimmungen*]" (GS §288), Nietzsche writes of a higher ideal for any human being: "To be a single great mood incarnate—that has hitherto been a mere dream and a delightful possibility; as yet history does not offer us any certain examples" (GS §288). Such an elevated mood would open new possibilities for being human, and correspondingly new

challenges. Consequently, the surrounding sections urge bold exploration: "Embark! There is yet another world to be discovered—and more than one" (GS §289). Nietzsche urges readers "to live dangerously! Send your ships into uncharted seas!" (GS §283).

Again, Nietzsche intertwines mood and style: "To 'give style' to one's character—a rare and great art!" (GS §290). I interpret this to mean that we should impose "an artistic plan" (GS §290) upon the creative chaos within us, to give shape to what is shapeless, even ugly. Nietzsche argues that the free self-imposition of "the constraint of a single style" promises "finest gaiety" to "strong natures" (GS §290). By contrast, Nietzsche suggests that "weak characters without power over themselves hate the constraint of style." That in turn leads to resentment and the yearning to punish others: "Whoever is dissatisfied with himself is continually ready for revenge and we others will be his victims" (GS §290). If resentment arises from a sense of inferiority in oneself and envy of others, then ethical self-cultivation in the Aristotelian tradition might be one remedy.¹²

Style leads to self-expression, then self-knowledge, then character formation. A single sentence puts the point most dramatically: "to improve one's style—means to improve one's thoughts" (GS §131). Art thus informs ethics, in the broadest sense of *ethos* as character. Artistry goes far beyond the walls of museums; we should learn from artists and architects about perspectives so as to become "artists of our own lives" (GS §299). As "artists of our own lives," our values, emotions, and actions can be artistic creations in the broadest sense.

Neither style nor mood could be a disembodied, cerebral concern. Hence Nietzsche repeatedly rejects Cartesian dualism and stresses the role of the body in knowledge:¹³

¹²In *Daybreak* §556, Nietzsche follows the Aristotelian tradition and lists four "cardinal virtues": honesty, bravery, magnanimity, politeness.

¹³As Robert Solomon suggests: "Cartesianism is the problem. Nietzsche's biologism is the answer" (81).

...this art of transfiguration *is* philosophy. We philosophers are not free to divide body from soul as the people do; we are even less free to divide soul from spirit. We are not thinking frogs, nor objectifying and registering mechanisms with their innards removed: consequently, we have to give birth to our thoughts out of our pain (GS Preface §3).

To transform styles and moods means to revalue embodiment.

Finally, Nietzsche confronts the moral-theological crisis of his age and announces for the first time his famous statement: “God is dead... And we have killed him” (GS §125). Yet Nietzsche urges us to recover from that traumatic loss and to reinterpret it as liberation. Indeed, one could view the entire project of the “joyful wisdom” as a sustained effort to change the mood of philosophy from nihilistic despair to cheerfulness. Within one key section titled “The meaning of our cheerfulness” (GS §343), which opens Book V, titled “We Fearless Ones,” Nietzsche moves from a mood of cultural despair over the past to one of joyous openness for the future. First, Nietzsche describes the death of God as a scarcely understood cause of collapse of “the whole of our European morality.” That in turn leads to a “sequence of breakdown, destruction, ruin, and cataclysm [*Abbruch, Zerstörung, Untergang, Umsturz*]” (GS §343). This loss portends a “monstrous logic of terror.” Yet in the next paragraph, Nietzsche urges his readers to transform these moods into their opposites:

They [the consequences] are not at all sad and gloomy but rather like a new and scarcely describable kind of light, happiness, relief, exhilaration, encouragement, dawn [*Licht, Glück, Erleichterung, Erheiterung, Ermuthigung, Morgenröthe*]. Indeed, we philosophers and “free spirits” feel, when we hear the news that “the old god is dead,” as if a new dawn shone upon us... the sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an “open sea” (GS §343).

VI.

In conclusion, we return to a question with which we began: why does Nietzsche drop the word *Stimmung* in late works? Corngold suggests a persuasive answer: it is probable that “Nietzsche’s abandonment of the category Mood is dictated by his rejection of Romantic-Idealist aesthetics” (Corngold 85). While a full discussion of the late works goes beyond the boundaries of this study, suffice it to say that Nietzsche continues his fascination with passions and affects, including related phenomena such as drives and desires. *Zarathustra*, rather than analyzing moods and passions from a clinical distance, dramatically enacts moods of comedy, tragedy, and parody, with moments of laughter, hope, confusion, and irony, as in a Platonic dialogue.¹⁴ In *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche turns to history and psychology to uncover hidden, even forbidden passions in the history of morality. The famous opening line insists we must discover the deeper self: “we are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge” (GM Preface).¹⁵ In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche dramatically asserts: “attacking the passions at the root means attacking life at the root” (TI “Morality” §1). In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche emphasizes the significance of philosophical style(s):

To communicate a state, an inward tension of pathos, by means of signs, including the tempo of these signs—that is the meaning of every style... I have many stylistic possibilities—the most multifarious art of style that has ever been at the disposal of one man... Before me, it was not known what could be done with the German language—what could be done with language in general (EH “Books” §4).

¹⁴On *Zarathustra* as a tragi-comic drama, see the works of Robert Gooding-Williams and Lawrence Hatab, among others.

¹⁵What of “women of knowledge” who read Nietzsche? See *Feminist Interpretations of Nietzsche*, among other works.

This passage revives the Greek term *pathos* and the phrase “inward tension,” as in the earliest essay on moods. We come full circle, from early works to late, on the *Leitmotif* of mood and style.

By tracing the evolution of Nietzsche’s thoughts on affects, from moods to passions to drives, we have simultaneously traced the philosopher’s changes, inheritances, and influences. At a time when the politics of resentment spreads, Nietzsche’s probing psychology into *ressentiment* helps us understand this toxic movement. We have also explored the connections between mood and style, affect and communication. Any truly original mode of writing will change the tone of philosophy.¹⁶ Last but not least, through Nietzsche’s revivals of the Greeks, we have once again discovered how the ancients are still our contemporaries and how they can guide us in times of crisis.¹⁷

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¹⁶On the significance of philosophical and literary styles, see the first chapter of Martha Nussbaum’s *Love’s Knowledge*.

¹⁷For valuable help with this article, I gratefully acknowledge Jeffrey Champlin, Barenboim-Said Akademie, Berlin; Kaitlyn Creasy, California State University, San Bernardino; and Cater Wang, Philosophy research assistant, Middlebury College.

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