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Editors’ Introduction

Welcome to the Spring 2019 issue of The Agonist. Included are three distinct essays that explore feigned insanity, the futility of time travel, and species extinction. Nietzsche is often misunderstood by his detractors as a prophet of doom, but only a shallow reading discovers an irreducible nihilism in his texts. That said, we readers of Nietzsche cannot fail to ignore his more prescient warnings about the dangers of nostalgia and the allure of self-destruction—both bodily and psychic ruin. In other words, what unites our essays is the respective authors’ ability to capture the broader pre-apocalyptic anxiety that seems to haunt public discourse in the early days of the 21st century: ecological ruin, mental illness, the failures of democracy, a misguided (and thus scientifically impossible) romantic longing to return to an imaginary past.

In lieu of climate change, continued social injustices, and the resurgence of nationalist fantasies, perhaps we still have much to learn from Nietzsche regarding foreboding prognoses. He reminds us that philosophy can and should contend not only with metaphysics and epistemology, but also cultural diagnosis. And few philosophers and physicians of culture have better gauged the temperature of our zeitgeist past, present and future.

We would like to thank all of our contributing writers, the members of our new advisory board, the editorial staff at The Agonist, and, of course, our readers. We look forward to hearing from you along with suggestions for any future topics.

The Editorial Board
May 2019
Essays
Twilight of the Humans:
Nietzsche, Dismal Politics, and the Coming Planetary Apocalypse

Andrew Johnson

Nature does not know extinction; all it knows is transformation.
-Wernher von Braun

There is time, if you need the comfort, to touch the person next to you, or to reach between your own cold legs...
-Thomas Pynchon (Gravity’s Rainbow 775)

§ I – A Fable: “Humanity is Dead!”

The death of all future generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. Human civilization has charted a one-way, irreversible course towards the end of history, planetary destruction, civilizational collapse, and the extinction of the human species. We (a general, amorphous, and problematic “we”) live in doomed days. The horizon of possibilities has grown dark and midnight approaches. A capitalistic death-drive prepares to ‘immanentize the eschaton’. Shrouded in darkness, the human herd scatters and scurries, screaming that ‘now, finally now, is the time to act,’ before neoliberal global capitalism makes all that is solid melt into air!

Political thought has yet to acknowledge that the contemporary moment is shrouded by the coming planetary apocalypse. Distracted by triumphant aggrandizements about democracy, rising standards of living, and declining rates of political violence, few soothsayers predict the eclipse of the foundational ideas which have determined the politics of the past several centuries (e.g. civil disobedience, contract, legitimacy, liberty, tolerance, separation of powers, rights, etc.). Unmoored, there is little guarantee that the search for new ideas will be

1 I would like to thank the organizers and participants of the Nihilism.Hope conference at the University of Victoria (April 2016), who provided feedback on an earlier draft. Acknowledgements also go to Michael Lang, Gregory Jones-Katz, Joshua Trevino, Doug English, and Jovian Radheshwar for their inspiration, fellowship, and support. Apologies to the nameless numbers not acknowledged whose influence nevertheless haunts these pages.
successful. Friedrich Nietzsche, more so than his precursors or contemporaries, is the crown-priest of an apocalyptic style of politics. In comparison to the teleological eschatology of Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, and Karl Marx, who each envision a perpetual peace grounded in liberalism or socialism, Nietzsche’s apocalyptic eschatology is a more fitting model for contemporary politics. It is the political principles of modernity which will obstruct social movements and their demands for effective, immediate response to ecological collapse. As put by Nancy Rosenblum: “We face the incapacity of democratic representatives to engage questions of intergenerational justice, indeed survival.” Democratic liberalism impedes politics and promises a dismal future. Begrudgingly and only through accumulating experience, the eternally recurring failure of eco-socialism will demonstrate the inescapability of a new political paradigm: eco-nihilism. Nietzsche’s philosophy is prophetic, announcing the horizons of our present, our politics. More and more, the next century will come to realize that Nietzsche is the philosopher par excellence who determined the politics of catastrophic climate change. The death of man is foretold. It is the tragedy of our day that this pronouncement is realized too late.

Nietzsche’s most well-known maxim first appears half-way through The Gay Science: “God is dead” (167). The madman announces in the marketplace that we have killed him. And yet, this pronouncement comes too early. We are trapped in caves transfixed by the shadows of the old buddhas. Modernity recast theology into secular institutions; we find transcendence in truth, science, morality, the state, etc. Vanquishing the resilient shadows of God may end up taking thousands of years. Nietzsche’s philosophy carries within it, silently affixed in its subterranean depths and unconscious impulses, vestiges of theology throughout. Gilles Deleuze asserts that “[w]e distort Nietzsche when we make him into a thinker who wrote about the death of God... what interests him is the death of man” (Foucault 129-130). It is we who have killed man. Mistaken that the species could live forever we sought a new God to dethrone. But in killing nature we condemned ourselves. It is humanity and our false idols that are finite and nature and an unredeemable earth that are infinite, capable of ceaseless transformation.

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2 The literal meaning of apocalypse refers to the disclosure and uncovering of knowledge. Eschatology is the study of last things, the end times, theologies concerning absolute knowledge, death, and the final judgement. In announcing a new messianism, Nietzsche’s political philosophy reveals much, but arrives after we have lost our faith.

3 I use the gendered term ‘man’ throughout. Some of this is admittedly, regrettably, stylistic. Nietzsche’s language is gendered. But it also feels reassuring to imagine, even if rhetorically, the coming catastrophe to be restricted to men.
Nietzsche’s earliest essays question the survival of the species and imagines divergent fates of humanity. These allusions are foundational for his later leitmotifs, revealing several thematic tensions: self-creation versus fatalism, life-affirmation overcoming nihilism, the will to power and the eternal return. This essay utilizes Nietzsche’s apocalyptic style to frame his political philosophy from beginning to end. By grappling with the future trajectory of human existence, Nietzsche’s philosophy announces the descent of man and its overcoming. The horizon of our politics is situated by this thought. If Nietzsche, the madman, was the first to pronounce “Humanity is Dead!” it is we, of the future, denounced as mad Cassandras but lamentably sober and sane, who are entrusted to erase the shadows of ruinous humanity.

The inevitability of species-extinction requires an untimely mediation. We look to the past the moment we realize there is no future. As humanity comes to terms with the likelihood of a delayed extinction, politics will devolve into a struggle for survival. As the world falls, each of us will seek out meaning in the meaninglessness of our preceding journey. Nietzsche’s warning appeared too early and the realization of existential danger too late. Humanity is a, tragically fated, species-toward-death, manifesting a destined devolutionary descent. The pronouncement of the end of man heralds a new, dismal politics worthy of our age.

§ II – On Knowledge and Life in an Extra-Moral Sense

In the opening and concluding scenes of Nietzsche’s opus, Zarathustra thus spoke: “You great star, what would your happiness be had you not those for whom you shine?” (9). It is predictable folly and hubris that the onset of catastrophic climate change is categorized as the Anthropocene. The Anthropocene-label is a crude anthropomorphism. While the impact of humans precipitated the rise of the planet’s temperature, it will be the volatility of the ecosystem that will threaten human life. Climate change is when nature strikes back. Whereas we have established with absolute knowledge what humans are and are not capable of, we do not yet know, but soon will, what the earth is capable of. The significance of the universe does not depend upon human existence. Humans are a self-obsessed species, who cannot contemplate a meaning outside of their own existence. The search for existential meaning is Nietzsche’s foremost endeavor and philosophy’s loftiest question.

Nietzsche’s “On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense”, one of his earliest essays, is a tour de force. Here at the very beginning of Nietzsche’s œuvre, in the very first lines, it is striking and significant that the critique of truth is prefaced by the
impermanence of the species. The fleeting evanescence of human existence chastens the narcissistic adulation of our grand artifices. Nothing is so valuable, or everlasting, that the colossal forces of nature could not wipe it from existence. World history when juxtaposed alongside natural time is rendered insignificant and meaningless. It is worth reading, and rereading, this opening passage, and then reading all of Nietzsche’s philosophy that follows as a footnote to this introductory thought.

In some remote corner of the universe, poured out and glittering in innumerable solar systems, there once was a star on which clever animals invented knowledge. That was the highest and most mendacious minute of ‘world history’ — yet only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths the star grew cold, and the clever animals had to die (42).

To acknowledge the death of God is to admit that humans are nothing more than clever animals accidentally existing, without purpose, necessarily finite. Knowledge is a particularity of human life. “For this intellect has no further mission that would lead beyond human life. It is human, rather, and only its owner and producer gives it such importance, as if the world pivoted around it” (ibid). The mosquito feels the same sense of self-centered importance, with none of the embarrassment or misery. Transcendental truths, fostered to preserve life, fabricate illusions as real. Knowledge is constructed in the service of life in the same way that fangs and claws sustain animal lives. While the stars will continue to smile long after we are gone, there is no beyond for knowledge without those human lives for which it shines. For Nietzsche, apocalypse reveals the problem of value, or what is and what is not valuable. Only by considering destruction is redemption possible and sought. The struggle of life consists in the recognition of our existential mortality; so too, knowledge and politics necessitates addressing the mortality of the species.

In Daybreak, a powerful ode to life, whose mere title contrasts with the sunset flight of Hegel’s philosophy (Shapiro 10), Nietzsche imagines “a tragic ending for knowledge” at the hands of a “self-sacrificing mankind” (Daybreak 31). Nietzsche posits a dangerous perhaps: that mankind could go extinct because of its passion for knowledge. “Perhaps mankind will even perish of this passion for knowledge!” (184). The drive for ever-more knowledge might result in a technoscientific suicidal plunge. Despite the cosmological interpretations of the eternal

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4 This parable appears not once, but twice, echoed, slightly different, in “On the Pathos of Truth.”
return, there is no going back or reverting to a prior barbarism. “[W]e would all prefer the destruction of mankind to a regression of knowledge... [I]f mankind does not perish of a passion, it will perish of a weakness” (ibid). Instead of accepting our fate and resigning ourselves to death, humans must struggle to survive using the very means which precipitated our collapse. Escaping impending extinction and planetary destruction requires the harnessing and acceleration of techno-science. Nietzsche poses a counter-perhaps, an absurd hope contrasted with the tragic ending of knowledge: “Perhaps, if one day an alliance has been established with inhabitants of other stars for the purpose of knowledge, and knowledge has been communicated from star to star for a few millennia: perhaps enthusiasm for knowledge may then rise to such a high-water mark!” (31). The survival of knowledge rests on humanity becoming astronauts, going beyond the earth, transcending our horizons and very humanity, and establishing cross-species political relationships throughout the galaxy. By becoming galactic voyagers, by sharing knowledge with other intelligent non-human life forms, knowledge, art, history might one day last forever.

Our individual mortality grounds our sense of humanity. Is it not a dangerous gambit to dream of the immortality of the species? The fear of extinction is that our disappearance implies we squandered life. To consider the end of the world is to confront a unique type of nihilism, such that human history would be rendered retroactively meaningless.

If in all he does he has before him the ultimate goallessness of man, his actions acquire in his own eyes the character of useless squandering. But to feel thus squandered, not merely as an individual but as humanity as a whole, in the way we behold the individual fruits of nature squandered, is a feeling beyond all other feelings (Human, All Too Human 29).

The coming planetary apocalypse makes species-preservation a political demand. However, existential meaning has normally been an individual, not a species-level, question. Species-extinction calls into question the meaninglessness of human existence as a whole. “It reminds us of the reasoning of Columbus: the earth was made for man... ‘It is probable that the sun should shine on nothing, and that the nocturnal vigils of the stars are squandered upon the pathless seas and countries unpeopled’” (Daybreak 26). Notice the repetition: ‘squandered’ is used similarly in two different books, in passages comparing pioneers lacking a final destination. It is worth expounding upon Nietzsche’s use of the phrase squander. I am as yet unaware of any reader of Nietzsche who has taken up this notion as fundamental for his philosophy. The threat of squandering is the source of
Nietzsche’s greatest fear. His entire philosophy is a demonstration of the futility of such a fear, but also a warning. It is not just that the meaning of life is called into question, but that meaning is determined by the quality of the life lived, the determination of one’s wasted opportunities. If meaning is use, meaninglessness is only attributed to the useless, to the wasted ones, to the discarded, to those who misuse and throw away what is of immense value. Further recall Zarathustra who asked the sun how it could be happy without those for who it shined. Like Columbus, must we colonize the universe so as to not squander our lives? Is it up to us, individually and collectively, to redeem the earth?

Book V of Daybreak is an extended treatment of the death of man. The first scene imagines a great silence. “Here is the sea, here we can forget the city [my emphasis]. The bells are noisily ringing the angelus – it is the time for that sad and foolish yet sweet noise, sounded at the crossroads of day and night – but it will last only for a minute!” (181). Notice the repetition: nature alongside, and overshadowing, civilization. Further recall the clever animals who only last a minute. “Now all is still! The sea lies there pale and glittering, it cannot speak… O sea, O evening! You are evil instructors! You teach man to cease being man! [my emphasis] Shall we surrender to you?” (ibid). Humans and their cities will one day become like the sea: silent. The death of God dismisses human exceptionalism. Our godlessness reveals our animality. But most importantly, undermining human idolatry reveals our lives as the accidental product of expansive, timeless, majestic natural forces.

Nietzsche deems our cultural habits destructive weeds. To save the world a transvaluation of values, ecological, economic, familial, sexual, social, political, etc., is necessitated. But we do not know whether we are at the end of history or the beginning of something else entirely. “[W]e live an existence which is either a prelude or a postlude, and the best we can do in this interregnum is to… found experimental states. We are experiments: let us also want to be them!” (190). The unknowability of humanity’s fate frees us to do anything, to radically experiment and transform ourselves, individually or collectively. With the death of God, we are taught, everything is now possible. We must create new values that empower our passions and vigor for life. In preferring death to happiness, we should rather collectively perish than return to pre-social, pre-scientific forms of existence. In a remarkable passage, one which captures the essence of the entire book and extended meditation on species-extinction, Nietzsche resolves that mankind end on its feet and defiant, not with head bowed and acquiescent. “This is the main question. Do we wish [mankind’s] end to be in fire and light, or in the sands?” (184).
Nietzsche ends the book with another fable, this one not of a city, but of brave birds flying far-fetched distances over a sprawling sea. Weariness prevents us from surpassing the horizon. “But what does that matter to you and me! Other birds will fly farther!... Will it perhaps be said of us one day that we too, steering westward, hoped to reach India – but that it was our fate to be wrecked by infinity?” (228-229). If Nietzsche introduced his philosophy, the critique of truth, value, external meaning, through the inevitability of human extinction, *Daybreak* represents the heroic refusal of such a thought. Humanity is compelled by a survival instinct. While humanity tarries dangerously close to ecological suicide, Nietzsche resists the diminishing of our horizons and the dying of the light. The dogged flight to the unknown transcends the pursuit of meaning for something grander and alien.

Nietzsche continues this line of thought in *The Gay Science*. The preservation of the species is depicted as an essential human activity and central political task. “Whether I contemplate men... I always find them concerned with a single task... to do what is good for the preservation of the human race... this instinct constitutes the essence of our species, our herd” (73). This passage challenges our understanding of Nietzsche as a radical individualist, dissuading his readers from acceding to herd mentality. I do not read this passage as dismissive of preserving the species. Quite the contrary, the pursuit of our self-interest belies an unobserved impulse to advance the collective. However, later in the same passage, Nietzsche demonstrates that these two cross-purposes should not be subsumed into each other. Nietzsche expresses his skepticism by arguing that this instinct has outlived its evolutionary purpose. “What might have harmed the species may have become extinct many thousands of years ago and may by now be one of those things that are not possible even for God. Pursue your best or your worst desires, and above all perish!” (ibid). *The Gay Science* completes the trilogy which began with “On Truth and Lying” and was continued in *Daybreak*. Species-extinction is not inevitable, species-survival is not just a remote possibility, but the mere contemplation of the future fate of the species is a dangerous abstraction. We should not think in terms of species-extinction or species-survival. We ought to think outside of time and judgment, in an extra-moral sense, because we have no way to knowing whether our actions serve a higher purpose. The most foolhardy and evil impulses result in the continuance and persistence of life. Developed here in this sequence is Nietzsche’s critique of causality and agency. There is no way of determining whether this or that individual or collective action preserves or imperils life. We ought not postulate extinction, nor be motivated by preservation. “To be sure, this economy is not afraid... of squandering” (*Daybreak* 184). Squander away!
The Gay Science is especially important as it juxtaposes the preservation of the species alongside Nietzsche’s foremost themes: the death of God and the eternal return. Vanquishing the resilient shadows of God requires overcoming the death of mankind. The madman announces the murder of God in the marketplace, accusing this thought, the great dangerous and mad contemplation of the future fate of the species, of being the culprit. “All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth for its sun?” (181). Note the difference and repetition: the sea which marks the limits of the horizon has now been transcended. For those brave birds there is no longer any land, only open-ended sea, outside of the sun’s orbit, an irreversible plotting towards infinity. “Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing?” (ibid). Humanity is unmoored, detached from gravity, no longer caught in orbit, lost adrift.

Nietzsche asks a rhetorical question that many have interpreted as a theoretical naturalism (Schacht). “When may we begin to ‘naturalize’ humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?” (169). Nietzsche’s naturalism is neither scientific nor methodological (Leiter). Nature is the descriptive terrain in which humans emerge and life is understood. Humanity is natural all too natural, being the product of nature and determined by natural processes, but nevertheless is distinct from nature. Humanity and nature are unalike by how each are constituted by temporality. Humanity is finite whereas nature is infinite. Nietzsche offers several warnings to faithful adherents of his philosophical naturalism. “Let us beware of saying that death is opposed to life” (168-169). The demise of the human species neither squanders nor vindicates our mendacious minute in the sun. “Let us beware of thinking that the world eternally creates new things. There are no eternally enduring substances” (169). Nothing lasts, humans most especially. Likewise, the promise of transhumanism is a false comfort. The world is not alive, nor is it a machine. Do not ascribe cyclical movements to a world that is actually chaotic. Nature is neither cruel, nor law-like. Contrast two rival descriptions of chaos. For the Greeks, chaos represented the void, the original nothingness that predated the Titans. That there is something rather than nothing is just as conceivable as it opposite, an eternal omnipresent nothingness. But there is also the chaos of theoretical physics which ascribes a process of randomness to nature. Is the randomness of the dice-throw and the monstrous void mutually exclusive? A commitment to chance admits that nothingness is an outcome amongst many. Humans might die out, or they might
endure forever. But the same logic does not apply to nature! I do not interpret
the eternal return cosmologically, or as a cyclical movement. There are far coarser,
arbitrary, entropic movements at work. The eternal return is coupled with a
metaphysics of chaos. The will to power is a metaphysical doctrine whereby
nature is the differential relations of competing forces. The will to power is pure
vitality. The eternal return is a regulative ideal, a process of ceaselessly recurring
transformation. The eternal return is the organizing principle of life and
Nietzsche’s enigmatic vision is portrayed in his account of physics. Together, the
will to power and the eternal return are an organized vitality. This is not a
conception of life and death, but life without death. Energy cannot be extinguished;
forces reorganize and regenerate. As a semi-infamous Nazi once claimed: nature
does not know extinction, it only knows transformation. “Therefore: long live
physics!” (266).

§ III – Beyond Freedom and Fatalism: Prelude to a Philosophy of the
Future

Though Nietzsche’s philosophy “is booby-trapped” (Williams 66), there is a
sincere honesty in his mischievous efforts to deceive (Johnson). Nietzsche’s
principal themes are pitted against each other, while being simultaneously
interconnected, producing a tension, but eventual coalescing, of rival conceptual
forces. These contradictory themes are not dialectical pairs, in which one
dommates and subsumes the other. Rather this style composites motifs, seemingly
at odds, into a complex whole.

The first notable tension is the contrast between freedom and fatalism.
Nietzsche is neither a proto-Existentialist (Soloman), nor a pseudo-determinist
(Leiter). Nietzsche champions ‘free spirits,’ those noble few who live dangerously
and courageously, never judging themselves. In other passages, he delimits our
capacity for basic self-knowledge, rejecting causality, intentionality, and purpose,
ruthlessly criticizing the enlightenment credo of free-will. For Nietzsche, we have
a managed freedom. We are situated in bodies and places which we have little
control over. We recognize in ourselves and others the heavy baggage of our
backgrounds. We engage in self-creation, while being subject to the recurring
randomness of life. Our actions are original causes. Nietzsche rejects Immanuel
Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer’s theories for their reliance upon a single
sovereign will. Rather, our drives and internal force are in competition with each
other. Nietzsche’s conception of will-power is a theory of multiple wills (Nietzsche
and Philosophy). The individual is not just one thing, but a competition of many
dissimilar things, interconnected but foreign. Nietzsche’s fatalism is not
deterministic. Nietzsche is not beholden to a naturalistic conception, where life is
ascribed in advance, individuals utterly incapable of manifesting their lot. Accepting one’s fate is a value conducive for living life. Fatalism leads to love, and therefore joy. We should love fate, and in so doing, love what becomes of us. Nietzsche’s maxim “amor fati?” is a paean to the affirmation of life. “I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things… some day I wish to only be a Yes-sayer” (223).

The contrast between freedom and fatalism is correlated with the survival or demise of the species. Nietzsche writes that “death and deathly silence alone are certain and common to all in this future” (225), while also admitting that we have remarkable capacity for preservation. There is no superlative meaning or superhuman attributes attained by establishing an interstellar network. Humans would not become God-like doppelgangers, Promethean pretenders. The belief in a beyond, whether in a transcendental heaven or a perpetual peace, committing to an imaginary teleology, is a slave mentality. Posted in the contradiction between today and tomorrow, in the interim where the fate of the human species is undecided, we do not know how to live and this not knowing is a weight too heavy to bear. Either we resign ourselves to passive pessimism or joyfully affirm an unknown future. If the choice is between accepting or rejecting our fate, we can do neither. “We of the present day are only just beginning to form the chain of a very powerful future feeling, link for link – we hardly know what we are doing” (The Gay Science 268-269). Instead of reading the development of these ideas in Nietzsche’s work as a cumulative sequence, I contend that we should read Nietzsche as maintaining multiple positions at once. Jean Granier classified Nietzsche’s thought as an “ontological pluralism,” inviting an “infinity of viewpoints.” Nietzsche allows varying perspectives, one no better than the others. By highlighting Nietzsche’s pluralism, we can recognize that there are multiple senses attached to his fluctuating discussions of the future fate of humanity. Nietzsche imagines numerous future trajectories, the most manifold of possibilities, all within a fleeting present. Human existence is infinite insofar as it contains a boundless series of choices and possibilities. “This godlike feeling would then be called – humaneness” (The Gay Science 269). Nietzsche’s apocalyptic style of politics is one where we are free to lament, enjoy, and love our fate, but not one where we can cause or prevent it. “Like trees we grow… not in one place only but everywhere, not in one direction but equally upward and outward and inward and downward… we are no longer free to do only one particular thing, to be only one particular thing. This is our fate” (332).
§ IV – The Gay Tragedy

The tension between freedom and fatalism is obliquely related to the affirmation of life and the pervasiveness of nihilism. We must love and affirm our fate, in spite of the nihilism resulting from our lack of control. The advent of nihilism is proclaimed with the death of God. Nietzsche’s described his age, as we ought to do to ours, as a decadent place, full of vices masquerading as values. To kill God, to recognize his death and vanquish the remaining shadows of theology, is to admit these values are false. For Nietzsche, nihilism entails “that the highest values devalue themselves” (Will to Power, 9). Meaninglessness is demoralizing. Nihilism is not the belief that nothing is valuable, but that modern life and its civilized norms are a corrosive charade. Nihilism therefore demands a reappraisal and subsequent transformation of all values. Nihilistic ruin opens the world to profuse creation. Nihilism is useful for life by portending the coming revolution in ideals; the undoing of the past extends the opportunity for an unbounded future. Gaiety is how individuals overcome nihilism. Affirmation is redemptive: rejoice, it is no longer necessary to suffer!

The death of God entails the death of man. “Nihilism, then, is the recognition of the long waste of strength, the agony of the ‘in vain’” (12). Nietzsche equates nihilism with squandering. Without purpose, humanity risks suffering, but gains what? Nietzsche demands that we not shy away from meaninglessness by finding comfort in counterfeit values. Humanity is not transcendentally valuable. “What we find here is still the hyperbolic naïveté of man: positing himself as the meaning and measure of the value of things” (14). We project ourselves into things, such that the sun only has meaning if it shines upon humans, the earth is redeemable only if inhabited, my individual life purposeful only if the species is preserved. Nihilism is the overcoming of this style of thought. “This long plentitude and sequence of breakdown, destruction, ruin, and cataclysm that is now impending – who could guess enough of it today to be compelled to play the teacher and advance proclaimer of this monstrous logic of terror, the prophet of gloom?” (The Gay Science 279). Nihilism is a revelation! Nihilism reveals the groundlessness of life: humans without earth or an earth without humans. Nietzsche seeks not only to overcome nihilism but also to affirm its necessity for realizing a truly groundless freedom. Nihilism clears away all that is false, so to begin the process of transfiguring humanity. Only then can we build anew, on shifting sands, in faraway galaxies, unchained from the sun and our cosmological rootedness on this earth.

We are weary of humanity because our choices risk squander. This precipitates a paralyzing experience. The preservation of the species does not redeem existence. “The sight of man is now a wearying sight – what is nihilism
today, if not this?... We are weary of man” (Genealogy of Morals 28). If, at first, species-extinction seems tragic, upon reflection, it is farcical. Even tragedies are exalted by the stories contained therein. Politics has entered an age of nihilism. As stated by Deleuze: “The kingdom of nihilism is powerful” (Nietzsche and Philosophy 171). The incapacity of humans, individually or collectively, to control our fate inhibits our capacity for action. However, inaction is an impossibility, and instead of not willing, humans will nothingness. The most alarming aspect of penetration of nihilism into political life is the triumph of passive or reactive forces. The last man is slavishly consumed by a purposeless happiness. As the world burns, they are content to casually eat their cake. If this exhibits the saying yes to life, affirming catastrophe, destruction, and extinction, it is a pitiful gaiety! The decadent and the hermits each stick their heads in the sand, resigned to fatal defeat and quiet sleep. The bitter and resentful lay blame and then scorn on a revolving litany of scapegoats. The preservation of life is touted as a political slogan justifying the sacrifice and destruction of life. The fascists, technocrats, and hopeful Sisypheans form an unholy alliance that delays extinction, extends suffering, and preaches shame.

§ V – Will to Non-extinction

The contrast between the experience of nihilism and the commandment to affirm life brings forth a final distinction: the will to power and the eternal return. The eternal return is a nihilistic experience, existence recurring inevitably without finale, meaning or aim, the same thing happening again and again without interruption. The eternal return is ambiguous because we have no way of knowing whether our present is at an ascending or descending moment in life. Nihilism is the half-way point of the eternal return. Responding at first passively then reactively, by affirming life we complete the loop.

My interpretation of the will to power and the eternal return is uncommon. And as Tracy Strong warns: “The will to power and eternal return traditionally represent the greatest stumbling blocks in any interpretation of Nietzsche” (218). The will to power is pure vitality, a confluence of differential forces competing with each other, impelling the forward thrust of existence. The will to power is the movement of life. Vitality is a theory of life different from that of the organic: vitality is force, the organic is a substance. Thus, when Nietzsche claims that “[t]he fact is that will to power rules even in the inorganic world, or, rather, that there is no inorganic world” (quoted in Nietzsche and Philosophy 62), he is positing that nature, even that which appears dead and inert, is a living composite of forces. The will to power conceives of being as dynamic, always-already in a state of becoming. The will of the will to power is not intentional nor singular, but
multiple. The will to power is more power than will-power, like flowing water slowly eroding a canyon over several millennia. The will feeds off of the energy of its own power. One will does not subsume another but is propelled by an internal momentum. The will intensifies, forces are compounded. The will to power flows, strives, aspires, commands, but is never fulfilled. Force is not extinguishable. Nature does not know extinction, only transformation. Alphonso Lingis succinctly asserts that will to power “is the chaos, the primal fund of the unformed – not matter, but force beneath the cosmos” (38). The will to power reveals an abyss, a groundless chaos.

The eternal return is the Apollonian order to the Dionysian madness of the will to power. “The Eternal Return, then, is the synthesis that has the Will to Power as its principle” (Nietzsche and Philosophy 46). The eternal return is the organizing form of life. Beneath the chaos of forces lies an encompassing, far deeper, more impenetrable void: time. The eternal return arose out of a vision, one Nietzsche found inexpressible. It is unconvincing that the eternal return refers merely to a cyclical notion of time. This doctrine, deeply embedded in philosophy, mythology, and theology, is certainly not the hallucinatory thought that Nietzsche toils to purport. Nietzsche warns against thinking in terms of cyclical movements, referring to our astral order as an exception, fashioning instead a style of thought more fitting a universe of nonlinear, irregular chaos. “Those thinkers in whom all stars move in cyclic orbits are not the most profound. Whoever looks into himself as into vast space and carries galaxies in himself, also knows how irregular all galaxies are; they lead into the chaos and labyrinth of existence” (The Gay Science 254). Nietzsche’s riddle does not advance a theory of circular time, but multiple futures, overlapping, connected in a single present moment. When Jorge Luis Borges poetically remarks that “[t]ime forks perpetually toward innumerable futures” (29), he faithfully, accidentally, articulates the eternal return as a theory of infinite possible worlds.

Pierre Klossowski’s hypothesis is that the eternal return is the lived experience of all possible worlds. The eternal return is to live all possible experiences, to follow each divergent path produced by one’s choices. No longer do we make choices once and for all, but we live all of our choices infinitely, across multiple dimensions. “The feeling of vertigo results from the once and for all in which the subject is surprised by the dance of innumerable times: the once-and-for-all disappears” (72). Here, the eternal return of time moves both forward and backward, endlessly creating, destroying, and re-creating itself, like a labyrinth we have traveled through completely, every route and pathway traversed. Gilles Deleuze’s version is less esoteric and otherworldly. The eternal return displaces the three-dimensional model of time as a past, present, and future. The will cannot reverse
the flow of time but is formed through an intensifying force. Deleuze echoes Klossowski’s vertigo but offers an alternative reading: the nausea of the eternal return is experiencing all possible worlds, but only being able to choose one of them, that choice being unchangeable, decided for all time. Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche maintains an allegiance to freedom and fatalism, the once-and-for-all is the basis of the eternal return, not its disappearance. The central issue for Deleuze is the mischaracterization of the eternal return as the return of the same: the eternal return is recurring difference. “Eternal return cannot mean the return of the Identical because it presupposes a world (that of the will to power) in which all previous identities have been abolished and dissolved … Repetition in the eternal return, therefore, consists in conceiving the same on the basis of the different” (Difference and Repetition 41). The metaphysics of the will to power undermines the uniformity of a recurring cycle. The eternal return is the repetition of our metaphysical reality, and our metaphysical reality is pure chaos. If “[r]eturn is the being of that which becomes” (Nietzsche and Philosophy 24), chaos and cycle are not in diametric opposition, but chaos, transformation, ceaseless becoming is naturalized as an eternal law. What we are becoming, we who are constantly choosing, is a one-of-a-kind endless fluctuation. Deleuze purports a repetitive present. Individuals have to decide, choosing one option, among many alternatives, forever.

What unites these two interpretations is their shared contention that Nietzsche’s concept signifies the existential supposition of multiple life trajectories simultaneously. The eternal return is the culmination of Nietzsche’s apocalyptic eschatology, what is to come is a multiplicity of possible worlds, each as unthinkable as the next, the eventual survival or extinction of the species each being one variant amongst an infinite diversity of alternatives. The most important derivable lesson is ethical: whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its return. The eternal return of never-the-same is a disjointed cycle of chaotic forces: (1) an initial ascension, (2) pulled back down by gravity, (3) descending into a dark underworld, (4) precipitating a final ascension into a qualitatively new and different repetition of the same process. “A thought only rises by falling, it progresses only by regressing” (Klossowski xvii). Every ascent necessitates a subsequent descent. Escaping gravity’s rainbow, requires we unchain the earth from its star, untether humanity from the galaxy. “This ascent will be betrayed to Gravity… The victim, in bondage to falling, rises on a promise, a prophecy, of Escape...” (Pynchon 774).
§ VI – A Dismal Politics for All, a Future for None

Nietzsche prefaces his philosophical system with a parable that mocks the vainglory of human achievement by invoking the inevitability of their extinction. Humanity is constituted by finitude; on a long enough time-line we are all dead. This becomes a guiding thought which is reiterated throughout the rest of Nietzsche’s writings. This parable foreshadows Nietzsche’s most novel concepts and focal themes. By rereading Nietzsche’s philosophy in terms of his apocalyptic prophecies we gain a greater understanding of his political thought. By evoking the politics of climate change we can observe that Nietzsche provided a style of thought more appropriate for our contemporary moment than the political theories of his precursors or contemporaries. Humans have an invincible drive for deception. Nietzsche believed himself to be the sole representative capable of grasping and expressing a forbidden terrain. More than any other political thinker, Nietzsche establishes the stakes of a politics where the survival of the species is in question.

Nietzsche warned of the impermanence of human life. In later works, he considered the possibility that we might circumvent this tragic fate. Later still, he renounced the mere contemplation of species-extinction or preservation as a maddening thought. It is the tragedy of our day that this prophecy was heeded too late. Nietzsche’s abject horror was the closing shut of possible horizons and the preclusion of the future. Now that the inevitability of a coming planetary apocalypse becomes more certain, we cannot help but welcome delusion of recovery, rescue, or escape. As the latter becomes less likely, and the former more adjacent, the futility of politics will indeed become increasingly maddening.

Industrial capitalism is the cause of the impending ecological collapse. Regrettably, as businesses have intensified their destruction of vital non-renewable resources, undermining our capacity of sustainability, they have captured control of our political institutions and made social life structurally dependent upon their goods and services. Democracies have proven themselves incapable of solving collective action problems, informing or motivating publics, responding quickly or effectively, and, it is no stretch of the imagination, will represent the biggest obstacles to the immediate, large-scale transformations needed. Again, Nancy Rosenblum establishes the political problem quite pertinently:

The existential threat of global warming is too hard to grasp, emotionally and cognitively. We in high-consumption countries are warned of catastrophe if we just keep doing what have been doing, and that the changes required go beyond energy-saving lightbulbs. Global warming undercuts foundational assumptions
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of economic growth... And the method for addressing it—‘discounting’—is beyond our ken.

Given the current trajectory of world history, preventing species-extinction would entail a massive transformation of values, a reconfiguration of the most basic habits of individual, social, and political life. Our enlightened liberal values (equality, democracy, liberty, the free market, bodily sovereignty, scientific progress, technological reliance, etc.) must be upended, all in the name of a nobler cause: species-preservation. Humans are incapable of the collective response necessary to prevent planetary destruction. In an avalanche every snowflake pleads not guilty! A transvaluation of our cultural practices is a practical impossibility. Some argue that those without hope will succumb to anti-politics. This argument relies upon crude, unsubstantiated psychological assumptions and is not a political solution. The arguments summoned to combat pessimism belie the inefficacy of present-day post-democratic institutions. Our political institutions are more demons than saviors. Nietzsche’s sage Zarathustra once evoked: “On earth there is nothing greater than I: it is I who am the regulating finger of God’—thus roareth the monster... the state, where the slow suicide of all— is called ‘life’” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra 49-50).

Nietzsche once proclaimed his destiny as a political thinker by boasting that “only with me does the earth know great politics” (Ecce Homo 96). The next century will not be the return of great politics, but the advent of dismal politics. The politics of the future will involve the scramble for and hoarding of resources, a genocidal struggle for survival, and a global diffusion of shame, misery, and blame. Gaiety, life-affirmation, and illusions of freedom will become increasing rare, and passive and reactive forms of nihilism will envelope the earth.

The realization of the coming planetary apocalypse and the dawning of dismal politics will be slow and ceaselessly questioned. Upon arrival, the frenzy will be instantaneous, erratic, and overwhelming. In the interregnum, politics will consist of the coming to terms with our dismal fate. As is fitting Nietzsche’s essential pluralism, we can delineate a series of political character-types which correspond to political ideology: the fascists, the Sisyphians, and the hermits corresponding with eco-authoritarianism, eco-socialism, and eco-nihilism. There will be sub-types and intermixing of each. The fascists of the future will not necessarily demonstrate the same xenophobic zeal. Deleuze and Guattari describe fascism as a suicidal death-drive. “There is in fascism a realized nihilism” (230). Liberals will finally achieve the end of history they have been portending. Liberals will unite with accelerationists in managing civilizational collapse. The Marxists and splinter-cells of well-intentioned technocrats will struggle against the fascists to avert, delay, or
ameliorate the effects of the coming climate catastrophe and the disintegration of our political and economic systems. Their efforts will be in vain and their only recompense will be that they tried and tried valiantly. Though they were born defeated, those heroic fools will forever cling to the audacious hope that life will endure. The hermits will ignore the approaching peril. Religious zealots will see upheavals as signs of divine punishment or God’s return. The decadent capitalists will subsist in gated communities and gaudy yachts, inventing ever-more luxuries to enjoy as the dispossessed gather at the gates. A joyous few might retreat to mountains or forests in hopes that tight-knit communities and reunifying with nature will shield them from the worst of the downfall and offer a glimmer of hope for a sustainable future. Those that hide from the coming apocalypse will laugh exuberantly, embrace innocence and irresponsibility, in the belief that the value and meaning of their lives, the squandering of existence, the survival of the species is not in the balance!

Nietzsche’s political philosophy was always illustrated by a revolving cast of characters. It is apropos that each of the contemporary character-types discussed, the fascist, the Sisyphean, and the hermit, are commonly associated with Nietzsche’s political thought. These archetypes eternally recur in different milieus. We might also recall, by way of conclusion, the prophetic ending of and motley crew inhabiting Nietzsche’s earliest essay “On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense.” The man of action binds himself to reason so as to not be swept away by his passions. The man of science builds his hut next to the towers of science as a bulwark against frightful powers. The scientist, equated with modern life, are conscious and aware of the world, diagnosing its patterns, but are no more woke or satisfied than those overcome by their fantasies. The intuitive man, associated with an ancient way of life, is filled with vigor, happiness, but also suffering. The rational man is indifferent and stoical. Nietzsche concluded his essay with the enigmatic parable: “When a real storm cloud thunders above him, he [the rational, stoic man] wraps himself in his cloak, and with slow steps he walks from beneath it” (46). A storm is blowing from paradise, there are no angels to witness, no Gods to save us, no cloaks to cover us, or paths where we might escape the coming catastrophe.

*There is a Hand to turn the time
Though thy Glass today be run*
-Thomas Pynchon (Gravity’s Rainbow 776)
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A Philosophical Argument Against Time Machines\textsuperscript{1}

Juliano C. S. Neves

Introduction

General relativity is the theory of space, time, and the gravitational phenomenon, which is generated by both matter and energy. The most important Albert Einstein's work has been tested and confirmed so far. The most recent test was the detection of gravitational waves by the international collaboration LIGO (The Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory).\textsuperscript{2} During the 20\textsuperscript{th} and 21\textsuperscript{th} centuries, general relativity has obtained successful results and reliability. But should every prediction in general relativity be considered reliable? Alongside general relativity's predictions such as gravitational waves, black holes, and the hypothetical big bang,\textsuperscript{3} the Einsteinian theory provides special space-time curves

\textsuperscript{1} Time machines are predictions of Einstein's theory of general relativity and provide a myriad of unsolved paradoxes. Convincing and general arguments against time machines and their paradoxes are missing in physics and philosophy so far. In this article, a philosophical argument against time machines is given. When thought of as a process, individuation refuses the idea of time machines, in particular travels into the past. With the aid of Nietzsche-Heraclitus' philosophy of becoming and Simondon's notion of process of individuation, I propose that time machines are modern fables, created by the man of resentiment. In the \textit{amor fati} formula of Nietzsche, I suggest the antipode to time machines.

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called closed time-like curves (CTCs). Time-like curves are natural paths of observers, i.e., humans and every object with mass travel in space-time through time-like curves. And, in particular, closed time-like curves are curves or paths where, according to general relativity, observers would travel into the past or into the future. Then, the question in general relativity is not merely time dilation or different elapsed times generated by relative motion of observers as described by special relativity. The main question in general relativity is geometric, that is to say, different space-times (also known as geometries in Einstein's theory of gravitation) may provide CTCs and—at least mathematically—a direct form to travel in time. Then, among researches in general relativity, CTCs mean “time machines.”

Time machines are amongst the most interesting and attractive subjects (especially for the general public) in theoretical physics. In general relativity, the possibility of returning into the past brings paradoxes like the problem, for an observer, of traveling into the past to kill, for example, his own grandfather. There exist some physical and philosophical arguments that try to avoid such paradoxes like the grandfather paradox. For example, Hawking with his chronology protection conjecture tries to avoid the paradoxes and causality violations that involve time machines. Hawking uses, among his arguments in order to reject CTCs, a confirmation according to which if time machines were possible, we would see “hordes of tourists from the future” (610). Moreover, Hawking indicates physical results, which come from both quantum theory and general relativity, in order to rule out travels into the past.

In the general relativity realm, the very first solution of Einstein's gravitational field equations that predicts CTCs was the van Stockum solution in the thirties. However, the existence of such curves in the van Stockum space-time was only

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pointed out by Tipler years later. The impressive Gödel universe as well as the two non-intersecting cosmic strings of Gott present CTCs as well. Therefore, as we can see, Einstein's theory of gravity provides naturally such curves, and a strong, definitive, and general argument that rules out time machines and their paradoxes is missing in physics so far.

In this paper, I present a philosophical argument in order to deny the physical reality of CTCs or time machines. According to the argument, time machines are forbidden because individuation is an uninterrupted process. That is, following Friedrich Nietzsche and Heraclitus' notion of becoming, and Gilbert Simondon's concept of process of individuation, it is shown that individuation—which not considered as a process—leads to the belief in isolated entities or milieu-independent entities, and, consequently, provides the belief in time machines. Accordingly, human individuals considered as isolated entities will be fictional because humans are generated by processes of individuation and are immersed in collective contexts. It is worth to emphasize that the argumentation in this article is philosophical one. In order to deny time machines (focusing on travels into the past), I will not use physical and mathematical concepts. I will emphasize the concept of individuation instead of physical-mathematical concepts as indicated,

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9 Physical arguments against time machines have been pointed out as well. In Introduction, we saw Hawking's argument. But, even in physics there are others. It is shown that Gott's time machine has non-physical origin or source in Deser, S., Jackiw, R., and 't Hooft, G. “Physical Cosmic Strings Do Not Generate Closed Timelike Curves.” *Physical Review Letters* 68: 267-269, 1992. On the other hand, in Pavan, A. B., Abdalla, E., Molina, C. “Stability, causality, and quasinormal modes of cosmic strings and cylinders.” *Physical Review D* 81 (4): 044003, 2010, the authors show that CTCs are unstable and unable to promote travels in time. However, those studies are not general, they were made from both a specific background, or class of space-times, and a particular quantum field, the scalar field in Pavan et al. Even Hawking's criticism depends on either the non-acceptance of the weak energy condition violation or the validity of large back-reaction effects, which would prevent formation of CTCs. But today in physics, violations in energy conditions are more acceptable since the detection of cosmic acceleration, promoted by dark energy, and back-reaction effects are speculations from an incomplete quantum theory of gravity. Thus, a general and convincing physical argument against CTCs is absent in physics today.
for example, in Earman et al. As we will see, the novel argument presented in this work is based on the concept of process of individuation. At the end of this article, it is suggested an origin for the time machines fable: the modern *ressentiment*. And in the *amor fati* formula of Nietzsche we find the antipode to the modern *ressentiment* and time machines.

**The Problem of Individuation**

I construct an argument against time machines from the philosophical concept of individuation, or generation of an individual. For various thinkers in the history of philosophy, individuation has an origin: a supposed principle of individuation (*principium individuationis*). The principle of individuation was a very useful concept adopted by philosophers. *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, for example, says that the principle of individuation is “what makes something individual as opposed to universal” (737). In this sense, a specific man is different from the universal man because of the principle of individuation. Then, according to this perspective, our world is made up of various entities, or individuals, for the principle of individuation is present.

In Schopenhauer's philosophy, the principle of individuation promotes the world as representation. As the thing-in-itself is the will, something beyond the principle of individuation,¹⁰ Schopenhauer claims that such a principle generates individuals from the will, or unity, which is the origin of the world, “the innermost essence, the kernel, of every particular thing and also of the whole.”¹¹ Therefore, unity, or the will, presents itself as a myriad of objects, i.e., our physical world is the will by means of the principle of individuation.

In the same direction, for the young Nietzsche, the principle of individuation is identified to a drive (*Trieb*), which receives the name of the Greek God Apollo. But the origin of the world, such as in Schopenhauer’s work, is attributed to unity, which in Nietzsche’s initial philosophy is the Primordial Unity (*Ur-Eine*) (BT I). The mature Nietzsche rejected Schopenhauer’s influence, and, from the maturity period, the philosopher created his own concepts, like will to power. Even the Primordial Unity was ruled out, because the world as wills to power is conceived of as plural.¹² Above all, the metaphysical principle of individuation was the

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¹⁰ In *The World as Will and Representation*, the principle of individuation is equivalent to space and time: “I shall call time and space the *principium individuationis*, an expression borrowed from the old scholasticism (...)” (Second Book, 23).


attempt of describing the multiplicity in terms of a unique origin, or a unique cause, for those important thinkers. Thus, individuation and its supposed cause, the principle of individuation, are ingredients in order to justify the physical world from a metaphysical origin.

Without metaphysical speculations, individuation may be seen as a natural process. Instead of a metaphysical principle, individuation may be conceived of as a process, described by physical and mathematical concepts, according to the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon. Thus, to think of Simondon’s individuation means to realize a process with degrees: “I intend therefore to study the forms, modes and degrees of individuation in order to situate accurately the individual in the wider being (…),” said Simondon. According to Simondon, an individual is a process of individuation acting. An individual, in his perspective, is a metastable system that comes from another metastable system: a preindividual system. Both living beings and physical objects are systems with non-vanishing potential energy, are processes, i.e., are non-static beings:

The process of individuation must be considered primordial, for it is this process that at once brings the individual into being and determines all the distinguishing characteristics of its development, organization and modalities. Thus, the individual is to be understood as having a relative reality, occupying only a certain phase of the whole being in question — a phase that therefore carries the implication of a preceding preindividual state, and that, even after individuation, does not exist in isolation, since individuation does not exhaust in the single act of its appearance all the potentials embedded in the preindividual state. Individuation, moreover, not only brings the individual to light but also the individual-milieu dyad.

For Simondon, the process of individuation, or individuation, does not generate an isolated being. The individual-milieu dyad also appears during the process. In Simondon, we find a description of the problem of individuation as uninterrupted process. Individuals are neither static beings nor isolated entities without any relation with the environment (milieu): a full, complete, and isolated individual is something fictitious. In relation to living beings, the process of individuation acts continuously, individuating itself: “The living being resolves its problems not only

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14 Ibid, p. 300.
by adapting itself which is to say, by modifying its relationship to its milieu (something a machine is equally able to do) — but by modifying itself through the invention of new internal structures (...).” Following Simondon, Weinbaum and Veitas proposed a new form to define and conceive of intelligence by means of the process of individuation. For those authors, intelligent agents emerge from a complex context and become intelligent from a process of self-organization and formation, where “individuation is a resolution of a problematic situation” (381).

In my point of view, Simondon's process of individuation carries concepts and similar interpretations to Heraclitus and Nietzsche's philosophy of becoming. Such as Heraclitus' world view (or at least the Platonic Heraclitus), we can see the importance of becoming, or process, in Simondon's philosophy. Denying any eternal substance, Simondon says that “the opposition between being and becoming can only be valid within a certain doctrine that supposes that the very model of being is a substance.” Such as in Nietzsche's philosophy, we may find the question about “stability” of individuals. In the mature Nietzschean philosophy, individuals are transitory configurations of wills to power.

In this article, the main argument in order to deny time machines—especially travels into the past—is found in an image from Heraclitus of Ephesus, and images, or metaphors, have been useful in science as well. In Thermodynamics, for example, the volume of a perfect gas may be thought of as a set of non-interacting little balls. In general relativity, the space-time curvature may be suggested by a heavy body upon a trampoline, deforming its surface. In particular, a metaphor underlies hypothetical time travels: it is the metaphor of a time traveler as a “free particle,” i.e., a time traveler playing the role of a non-interacting particle. As we will see, an isolated individual, generated by a hypothetical principle of individuation or, equivalently, a complete process of individuation is the origin for such a metaphor. Then, the metaphorical ingredient is present to think of (or to construct) reality in the most abstract natural science as well.

15 Ibid, p. 305.
Heraclitus, “the philosopher of becoming,” is supposed to say, according to Plato, “that all things are in motion and nothing at rest (...)”\textsuperscript{20} The philosopher of Ephesus compared all things “to the stream of a river” and said “that you cannot go into the same water twice.”\textsuperscript{21} Not only the river flows, but everything is in flux, even the observer who observes the flux: “In the same river, we both step and do not step, we are and we are not”.\textsuperscript{22} Thus Heraclitus denied stability for the entire world. For Nietzsche, above all, Heraclitus denied the concept of being as something static, considering it illusory and fictitious. The German philosopher and philologist, Nietzsche, was a hard critic of the philosophical language. Behind philosophical concepts, Nietzsche saw prejudgments and idiosyncrasies. Nietzsche, in the mature period of his work, criticized philosophy and its dogmas, philosophers and their bias and prejudgments. By means of a strong language criticism, the German philosopher attacked the foundations of philosophy and science. And the notions of both thing and the thing-in-itself are within his criticism. In a fragment of 1887, Nietzsche wrote (KSA 12:10[202]):

The “thing-in-itself” absurd. If I think away all the relationships, all the “qualities”, all the “activities” of a thing, then the thing does not remain behind: because thingness was only a “fiction added” by us, out of the needs of logic, thus for the purpose of designation, communication (...).

The German philosopher considered the concept of thing-in-itself absurd because every “thing,” as language construction, depends on humans, it is related to humans. Nietzsche also criticized the notion of thing in a passage in which mathematics and the classical logic, or the principle of identity, are attacked:

The invention of the laws of numbers was made on the basis of the error, dominant even from the earliest times, that there are identical things (but in fact nothing is identical with anything else); at least that there are things (but there is no “thing”) (HH 19).

According to Nietzschean philosophy, a specific “thing” is a human creation. More specifically, it is a creation from the human body—it depends on the body


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Heraclitus of Ephesus}, 49a, in Freeman, K. \textit{Ancilla to the pre-Socratic philosophers: a complete translation of the fragments in Diels}. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948.
structure. Kant's forms of sensibility and the understanding, which are conditions to think of and to know an object, are transferred to the human body in Nietzsche's philosophy. For Nietzsche, a given thing is an interpretation of becoming. Nietzsche followed Heraclitus and adopted the same point of view of the Ephesus thinker. That is, Nietzsche's world view in his maturity is Heraclitean in some degree. The world is interpreted as becoming (Werden), i.e., the nature of the world is change, process, flux or wills to power struggling: “becoming, effecting, is only a result” of wills to power (KSA 13:14[79]). In another fragment, the philosopher wrote: “All that happens, all movement, all becoming as a determining of relations of degree and force, as a struggle (...)” (KSA 12:9[91]). That is, “This world is the will to power — and nothing besides!” (KSA 11:38[12]). Therefore, Nietzsche assumes Heraclitus’ river image or, at least, the Platonic interpretation of Heraclitus. In *Ecce homo*, the German philosopher wrote on his Dionysian philosophy and his affinity with Heraclitus' philosophy:

> The affirmation of passing away and destruction that is crucial for a Dionysian philosophy, saying yes to opposition and war, becoming along with a radical rejection of the very concept of “being” — all these are more closely related to me than anything else people have thought so far (EH “The Birth of the Tragedy” 3).

According to his Dionysian philosophy, a given “thing,” or individual, is conceived of as a “clipping” from becoming, and the concept of “being,” as something stable, is only a fiction that comes from a drive that refuses the total becoming. In *Twilight of the idols* he said: “(..) Heraclitus will always be right in thinking that being is an empty fiction” (TI “Reason in philosophy” 2). Therefore, in this perspective, a totally isolated object, or individual, such as a free particle (an extreme act of individuation in physics created in order to simplify

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23 Body in Nietzsche means mind, spirit as well: “Of all that is written I love only that which one writes with his blood. Write with blood, and you will experience that blood is spirit” (Z I “On Reading and Writing”).


25 Nietzschean view on war was constructed from the Greek concept of agon. In an initial text, The Homer's contest of 1872, the young Nietzsche emphasizes the dispute as a Leitmotiv in the ancient Greek culture.
calculations because a free particle does not interact), and something stable like the Parmenidean “being” are only chimeras.

The river image, or metaphor, provides an argument against time machines. First of all, time machines, especially travels into the past, assume full processes of individuation because human travelers are conceived of as isolated, static beings, and detached “things” from becoming, from the universal flux, and from a milieu. Supposedly, the traveler through a CTC would return to another point over the river, interacting with another historical time and context, or another milieu as Simondon called. But in the river image, to abandon becoming and to travel into the past are impossible. The belief in some sort of complete individuation—provided by an interpretation of individuation as non-process, supposedly generated by the principle of individuation—leads to the belief in humans as something detached from becoming, or from some sort of context. The river picture, in turn, and essentially the becoming perspective reveal such a hypothetical travel as science fiction because the full individual—as a “free particle”26—and the Parmenidean concept of being are fable. The individual is not an aeterna veritas (eternal truth), is not apart from the universal flux, and, according to Nietzsche, this is a common error in philosophy:

All philosophers have the common failing of starting out from man as he is now and thinking they can reach their goal through an analysis of him. They involuntarily think of “man” as an aeterna veritas, as something that remains constant in the midst of all flux, as a sure measure of things (HH 2).

The pictorial argument presented in this article—the becoming point of view—does not deny time dilation (or different elapsed times) described by both special relativity and general relativity.27 Such as on the ordinary river, flux in Heraclitus’ river is not invariant. In a real river, the fluid velocity depends on the position and depth. A mass or volume of water (an “individual” or “being” in this metaphor) will have different velocities if its position is close or not to the margin, or at a great depth. Different elapsed times given by Lorentz's transformations in

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26 This is another metaphor. A “real” traveler through a CTC would experience tidal forces during a hypothetical time travel. The term “free particle” here indicates only an isolated individual from any context.

27 In special relativity, time dilation is given by the relative motion of observers. On the other hand, in general relativity, time dilation is given by the gravitational redshift, which is generated by variations in the gravitational field and provides the GPS (Global Positioning System) technology.
special relativity would be assured in Heraclitus' metaphor because the universal flux is not ever the same. But CTCs or travels into the past would be ruled out.

The dear reader could ask me about the possibility of traveling over an ordinary or real river. By using a boat, for example, a traveler could reach any point over a real river. However, in this example, the boat does not make part of the universal flux. In this argument, the boat is considered as something firm, as a stable being—something different from becoming. But Heraclitus taught us that “all things are in motion” (including that boat), or that all things flow, and thus spoke Zarathustra in a brilliant passage in which the Ephesus philosopher and his doctrine are indicated (Z III “On Old and New Tablets” 8):

If timbers span the water, if footbridges and railings leap over the river, then surely the one who says “Everything is in flux” has no credibility.

Instead, even the dummies contradict him. “What?” say the dummies, “everything is supposed to be in flux? But the timbers and the railings are over the river!

Over the river everything is firm, all the values of things, the bridges, concepts, all 'good' and 'evil' — all of this is firm!”

But when the hard winter comes, the beast tamer of rivers, then even the Wittiest learn to mistrust, and, sure enough, then not only the dummies say: “Should everything not — stand still?”

“Basically everything stands still” — that is a real winter doctrine, a good thing for sterile times, a good comfort for hibernators and stove huggers.

“Basically everything stands still” — but against this preaches the thaw wind!

The thaw wind, a bull that is no plowing bull — a raging bull, a destroyer that breaks ice with its wrathful horns! But ice — breaks footbridges!

Yes my brothers, is everything not now in flux? Have all railings and footbridges not fallen into the water? Who could still hang on to “good” and “evil”?

“Woe to us! Hail to us! The thaw wind is blowing!” — Preach me this, oh my brothers, in all the streets!
Amor Fati Contra Time Machines

Considering modernity, Nietzsche's diagnosis is clear: the phenomenon of ressentiment (resentment) is present. Then, it is not difficult to identify the reason why modern man believes in time machines. Firstly, modernity emphasizes individuation, insofar as it created the image of citizens as social atoms. However, as we saw, such an image is not appropriate when we adopt the notion of process of individuation. Secondly, that man of ressentiment believes that it is possible to travel into the past not only in order to witness historical events but in order to correct them. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche describes that type of man, whose archetype is Socrates, who believes “that thought, as it follows the thread of causality, reaches down into the deepest abysses of being, and that it is capable, not simply of understanding existence, but even of correcting it” (BT 15). I argue that the time machine fable is, above all, created by ressentiment, i.e., the phenomenon of ressentiment is the origin for hypothetical travels into the past. Such a fable comes from the impossibility of accepting fate. On the other hand, it is by means of the amor fati formula that Nietzsche denies the modern ressentiment and (likely) would reject time machines:

My formula for human greatness is amor fati: that you do not want anything to be different, no forwards, not backwards, not for all eternity. Not just to tolerate necessity, still less to conceal it — all idealism is hypocrisy towards necessity —, but to love it... (EH “Why I am so Clever” 10).

Han-Pile emphasizes that the Nietzschean formula assumes “a transformation, not of the past, but of ourselves” (242). Then we may conceive of amor fati as an alternative to time machines (and a criticism), i.e., the amor fati formula of Nietzsche “represents a human, heteronomous alternative to willing backwards (...),” according to Han-Pile (243).

By associating time machines—in particular travels into the past—with the man of ressentiment, it is possible to advocate, as Nietzsche indicated in On the Genealogy of Morality, the lineage of modern science, which points toward the priest (the archetype or personification of ressentiment, according to Reginster28), a representative of the ascetic ideal. For priests, the ascetic ideal means “the actual priestly faith, their best instrument of power and also the “ultimate” sanction of their power” (GM III 1). Thus science, according to Nietzsche, “is not the

opposite of the ascetic ideal but rather the latter’s own most recent and noble manifestation” (GM III 23), and the time machine fable suggests such a relation.

Final Remarks
Closed time-like curves (CTCs), or time machines, are objects within Einstein's theory of general relativity. The van Stockum space-time and the Gödel cosmological model are examples of solutions of Einstein's field equations that possess CTCs. Researches have proposed physical and philosophical arguments in order to exclude time machines as physical realities and its inherent paradoxes. However, a strong, general, and persuasive argument that rules out time travels, especially travels into the past, is missing in physics and philosophy so far. Arguments like Hawking's chronology protection conjecture show that ingredients beyond general relativity are necessary in order to reject time machines. Therefore, this paper presents an ontological argument against time machines that comes from the philosophy of becoming. Individuation thought of as a non-process, supposedly generated by a metaphysical principle of individuation, motivates the belief in human beings who would travel into the past. In an exaggerated degree, individuation as non-process gives rise to the belief in human beings conceived of as isolated beings, as something separated from their contexts and milieus. However, an individual emerges from a society, culture with values and language, and from a specific historical time. The belief in complete individuation ignores such a condition, and one dreams with humans as “free particles” traveling into the past. Then, by using Simondon's process of individuation, Heraclitus' river image, in which “everything is in flux,” and Nietzsche's “radical rejection of the very concept of 'being,'” time machines appear as subject of science fiction, and CTCs become non-physical objects of Einstein's theory of gravity. Lastly, I proposed a psychological origin for the time machine fable. The modern resentment gives rise to the time travel fable, in which a hypothetical and optimistic time traveler would correct all historical events. Then, the amor fati formula of Nietzsche is a response to the resentful time traveler.

Works Cited
THE AGONIST


Nietzsche’s Will to Madness

Richard Schain

Sometime during the last week of December 1888, Friedrich Nietzsche apparently fell into complete insanity. Many causes have been put forth as to the origin of his mental breakdown. The thesis advanced in this article is that Nietzsche himself deliberately decided to pass over into ‘madness.’ The evidence for this statement has been derived from his published works, his correspondence, and his personal circumstances. Like the fate of the mad Mr. Hyde in Robert Louis Stevenson’s novel *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*, there was no road back to normality for him.

Since the previous mid-November, Nietzsche’s letters were revealing suggestive breaks with reality and a grandiosity that was excessive even for him. But the complete break did not seem to occur until December 31, when he sent a letter to August Strindberg stating he meant to have the young Emperor [of Germany] shot and that Strindberg and he must divorce. He signed the letter *Nietzsche Caesar* (KSB 8:1229, p. 567). Subsequently, during the first week of January 1889, he sent at least a dozen, and probably more, brief notes to friends, former colleagues, and the king of Italy that had the effect of announcing his madness. A last long letter on January 6th to Jacob Burckhardt in Basel (KSB 8:1256, p. 577-579) caused consternation in Burckhardt and in Nietzsche’s longtime friend Franz Overbeck who had also received a ‘mad’ note. An eminent psychiatrist in Basel, Professor Dr. Ludwig Wille, was consulted. It was decided that Overbeck should immediately travel to Turin to rescue Nietzsche.

When Overbeck arrived at Nietzsche’s room on January 8th, he described the condition in which he found Nietzsche in a letter to Peter Gast [a.k.a. Heinrich Köselitz]:

I saw Nietzsche in a sofa corner crouched down and reading—as it turned out, the last proof of *N contra Wagner*—he looked horribly decrepit; recognizing me, he threw himself upon me and embraced me violently, breaking into a torrent of tears, then sinking back on the sofa, twitching and quivering. I too could hardly stand upright from the shock. Did the abyss open before him at that moment or was he plunged in it already? The entire Fino family was present [his landlords]. Scarcely had he started moaning and quivering again when he was given some bromine water that stood on the table. In a moment, he was calm...
again and smiling; he began to speak of the great reception that was prepared for the evening. So he was in the grip of delusional ideas that never left while I was with him. He broke forth into loud singing and frenzied piano playing, fragments from the mental world in which he had been recently living and interspersed with indescribably uttered expressions, sublime, wonderfully insightful and unspeakably horrible things about himself as a successor to a dead God, all punctuated by chords from the piano after which convulsions and outbursts of unspeakable suffering followed…. (Verrecchia 1986, 255)

There were a few details Overbeck left out of his letter to Peter Gast. It appears that Nietzsche danced naked in the room, evoking the antique customs of holy sexual frenzies (Verrecchia 1986, 265). It left no doubt in Overbeck’s mind that his friend had suffered a complete mental breakdown. He arranged to have him brought back to Basel immediately. In Basel, Nietzsche was quickly admitted to the Basel Psychiatric Clinic headed by Dr. Wille. The diagnosis made was ‘progressive paralysis’ (general paresis), a common diagnosis of that era in mental institutions. In 1888, there was already a suspicion that progressive paralysis was a late manifestation of syphilis. In 1902, when Nietzsche had become famous (he died in 1900), a monograph was published by the noted neurologist Paul Möbius in which was revealed for the first time to the public that Nietzsche suffered with general paresis, a syphilitic disease of the brain resulting in insanity. From that point on, general medical opinion was that Nietzsche had suffered with late onset syphilis, a brain degeneration associated with agitation alternating with euphoria and emotional instability, symptoms that Nietzsche had frequently exhibited. The only question was whether or not his disease had affected his philosophical activity. Opinions varied on this subject.

However, there were doubts often expressed about the validity of the diagnosis (Schain 2001, chapt. 10). The course of Nietzsche’s illness was not typical with the usual course of general paresis. This diagnosis had become in the nineteenth century a common ‘wastepaper basket’ diagnosis applied to many individuals with uncertain neuropsychiatric disease. With the advent of the laboratory diagnosis of syphilis, the number of diagnosed cases dropped precipitously. Other causes have been offered to explain Nietzsche’s breakdown—drugs (his sister’s explanation), cerebrovascular disease with occult strokes, schizophrenia, manic-depressive psychosis, fronto-temporal (brain) degeneration, and even Lyme’s disease. None of these proposals have had enough evidence to receive general acceptance.
There are cogent reasons to believe that Nietzsche’s ‘madness’ was not due to any exogenous agent nor to any intrinsic mental disorder but was a \textit{willed act} on his part. Many indications in his history and writings suggest that this is what happened. In one of his earliest published books, \textit{Morgenröte} (1881), written after resigning his professorship at Basel, the following passages can be found under the label \textit{Significance of madness in the history of morality}:

Nevertheless, when I say new and deviant ideas, values, desires again and again broke out, these occurred with a fearful accompaniment: almost everywhere it was madness that paved the way for the new ideas, that broke the spell of honored usage and superstition.

Later in the same passage,

Ach, so give me madness, you heavenly powers! Madness, so that I can finally believe in myself! Give delirium and convulsions, sudden lights and darkness, terrify me with frost and heat, as no mortal has ever felt, with roars and prowling forms, let me howl and whimper and creep like an animal; so only that I may find faith in myself! Doubt consumes me, I have killed the Law; the Law frightens me as a corpse does a living person: if I am not \textit{more} than the Law, then I am the most depraved of all. (KSA 3:14)

One wonders if this is a script for what followed seven years later in Nietzsche’s life.

Nietzsche’s next book, \textit{Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft} (1882), has a passage in the same vein but more depressing, in spite of the title of the book:

\textit{Homo poeta}—I myself, having made this tragedy of tragedies entirely on my own; I who have first tied up the knot of morality so tightly that only a God could loosen it—as Horace demanded!—I myself have murdered all the Gods in the fourth act—from Morality! What is now to become of the fifth? Where to get the tragic solution? Must I begin to think about a comic solution? (KSA 3:153)

Podach (1931, 157) suggests that Nietzsche found this solution in a passage from \textit{Beyond Good and Evil}:

—In any case, with such a wish, it is necessary to be clear what one will get to see: only a satyr’s game, only a farcical epilogue, only the ongoing proof that the
long real tragedy is at an end: assuming that every philosophy in its development was a long tragedy. (KSA 5:25)

The final passage I shall quote from Nietzsche’s published works—although there are others—is from *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (1886) and exhibits his mood of extreme pessimism:

The depravity, the destruction of higher men, of alienated souls is the rule; it is frightening to have such a rule always before one’s eyes. The many-sided torment of the psychologist who has discovered this destruction, the entire inner “hopelessness” of higher men, this eternal ‘too late!’ in every sense, at first and then almost always again discovered throughout history—can one day embitter him, turn him against his own lot and lead him toward his own destruction—so that he himself becomes “depraved.” (KSA 5:269)

One can find other forms of evidence of his inclination toward madness in his correspondence at the end of December and the first week of January. A clue as to his intentions can be found in the letter to Peter Gast on Dec. 16 that is concerned with his publications. In the middle of the letter, he abruptly remarks: “Every so often I think why should I accelerate too much the tragic catastrophe of my life, which begins with *Ecce*” (KSB: 1192). But Nietzsche must have changed his mind because in a letter to Gast dated Dec. 31, Nietzsche wrote, “Ah friend! What a moment—when your card arrived, what had I done then…It was the famous Rubicon—I don’t know my address any longer: we can assume that it should be the Palazzo del Quirinale” [Italian official residence in Rome] (KSB:1228).

This is a most significant statement. The Rubicon was the fateful river in Italy across which Julius Caesar led his legion to eventually become Emperor. It has come to signify a point of no return for the one who crosses it. Nietzsche identified with Caesar and signed a letter to Strindberg, “Nietzsche Caesar.” We are entitled to assume that the Rubicon for Nietzsche meant the crossing over into madness, into a break with reality as societies of human beings consider it to be. Nietzsche never wrote anything that was without meaning for his own life.

August Strindberg was the individual in Europe perhaps most capable of understanding Nietzsche at this time. Like Nietzsche, he was a brilliant and multifaceted writer. He had just gone through a severe episode of mental illness himself, which he had utilized to write two of his most interesting books. The two admired each other’s works and Nietzsche had asked him to translate *Ecce*
When Strindberg received one of Nietzsche’s ‘madness’ notes, he immediately understood its significance. He replied in kind with both a Greek and a Latin quotation: “Carissime doctor! θελω, θελω μανηνατ!” (Anacreon), meaning “I will, I will be mad!” A quote from the Latin poet Horace follows: “Better wilt thou live, Licinus, by neither always pressing out to sea nor too closely hugging the dangerous shore in cautious fear of storms.” A phrase from Strindberg in Latin follows: “Meanwhile it is a joy to be mad!” Strindberg’s reply and translations from the Latin are found in Middleton (1969, 344-45). But Nietzsche did not follow Horace’s (and Strindberg’s) advice. What may have been initially ‘simulation’ of madness eventually became a fixed condition in which there was no way back to ‘normal’ life.

It is revealing to note that during the first week of January 1889 when Nietzsche was sending out his madness notes, he sent several notes to his publisher C. G. Naumann in Leipzig (KSB, 8:1233,1236,1237). These are brief, to the point, and without any trace of madness. They give directions to publish Ecce Homo immediately, prior to Nietzsche contra Wagner, and to return the two poems that were to end it. “Forward with Ecce!” Nietzsche wrote. Herr Gast was to be notified of the change of plans. Tellingly, he ends the last note, “Address as usual, Turin.” Two days before, in his letter to Peter Gast about crossing the Rubicon, he had said he no longer knew his address, it might be the Palazzo del Quirinale. In the midst of sending out his ‘mad’ notes, Nietzsche was obviously at this point capable of writing a perfectly sane one if he wished to do so.

Soon after his arrival in Basel, Nietzsche was transferred to the Psychiatric Clinic in Jena in order to be near his mother’s home (although she was allowed to see him only occasionally). He was under the care of Otto Binswanger, a prominent neuropsychiatrist and specialist in the pathology of neurosyphilis. He remained in the Clinic [hospital] for fourteen months. During this period the hospital records, given in detail by Podach (1931, chapts. 5, 6), indicate he was noisy, often violent, incoherent, apparently in a fully delusional state.

Shortly after admission to the Jena Clinic, Nietzsche was visited by Peter Gast who did not think he looked too bad. In a letter to their mutual friend Carl Fuchs, he wrote he had seen Nietzsche in a state that “seemed to him—horrible to say—as though he were only pretending to be insane, as though he were glad to have ended this way.” He believed Nietzsche “would be just about as grateful to his rescuers as somebody who has jumped into the water to drown himself and has been pulled out by some fool of a coastguard” (Podach 1931, 214). Overbeck expressed a similar view in a later publication, “I cannot escape the horrible
suspicion that arises within me at certain definite periods of observation, or at
least at certain moments, namely, that his madness is simulated. This impression
can only be explained by the general experience which I have had of Nietzsche’s
self-concealment, of his spiritual masks. But here, too, I have bowed to facts
which over-rule all personal thoughts and speculations” (Podach 1931, 215). But
what Overbeck thought were facts are questionable.

Nietzsche was released to the care of his mother in March 1890. He lived for
ten more years. Initially, he was able to take long walks with his mother but at
times exhibited outbursts of rage. One thing he was able to do from his former
life is to improvise on the piano. But gradually he sunk into apathy and became
bedridden. Some visitors who saw Nietzsche commented on the strange ‘aura’
that seemed to surround him. In August 1900 he developed a cold that progressed
into pneumonia. He died August 25, 1900 six weeks short of his 56th birthday.
Strangely, no autopsy was performed in spite of the many questions about the
cause of his breakdown—and even though his physician Dr. Binswanger was an
authority on pathology of the brain.

Elizabeth Nietzsche, his sister, staged an elaborate funeral. Many pretentious
‘unNietzschean’ things were said at the ceremonies, which were long drawn-out
epitaph would have been that given for Hamlet by Horatio in Shakespeare’s play.
Hamlet was Nietzsche’s favorite literary character, who by his resort to masks,
buffoonery, and suicide might be considered the later Nietzsche’s alter ego:

“Now cracks a noble heart. Goodnight, sweet prince,
And flights of angels sing thee to thy rest!”

Nietzsche was a virtual unknown at the time of his breakdown, except to a
few individuals outside of Germany. But soon after his admission to the mental
institutions, the German press reported about a philosopher who had gone mad
and was institutionalized. Interest in Nietzsche and his writings began to develop.
Like a match applied to a woodpile, Nietzsche’s fame began to blaze up in
Germany and then elsewhere in Europe. The adroit publicity generated by his
sister who acquired his literary estate no doubt hastened the process. By the time
of his death, he was a celebrity figure. It has been reported that German soldiers
during the First World War carried copies of _Thus Spoke Zarathustra_ in their
knapsacks. All this happened while Nietzsche himself sunk into deepening apathy
and was incapable of becoming aware of his fame. This perhaps was the most
poignant tragedy of his life.
Over a century after his death, it is impossible to state with absolute certainty
the cause of Nietzsche’s mental breakdown. Perhaps it is not even that important
since it is his writings, not his persona, that have had a profound effect on world
letters. But people want to know about the lives of writers who have stimulated
them to new dimensions of thought. Without Nietzsche’s madness, it is very
possible that Nietzsche and his writings would have sunk into oblivion or been
reduced to a few footnotes in scholarly tracts. There were certainly contributory
factors to his breakdown, whatever the primary cause might have been. At that
time, Nietzsche lived alone in cramped circumstances (one rented room), he had
no friends or relatives nearby, he had a very imperfect knowledge of the language
of the country in which he lived. His Basel pension was being reduced and his
books did not sell; he had to pay to have his writings published. He was probably,
as he said of himself, three-quarters blind. All these factors must have weighed
on him (in spite of his protestations to the contrary) and must have contributed
to the temptation to drop out from the ‘normal’ world, although he may not have
been fully aware how destructive the long-term consequences were to be for him.

Perhaps even more relevant was the presence of an unconscious awareness
that he, the preacher of the Übermensch, of the will to power, of the dominance
of the instincts, was, after all, just a meek little near-blind German philosopher to
whom nobody paid any attention. His few clumsy attempts at sexual relationships
had been dismal failures. What if he was a unique prose stylist with the German
language? What if he had a few isolated readers far away? The German
intellectuals had ignored or made fun of him. He had rejected metaphysics so that
no God could help him. Zarathustra was a figment of his imagination, not a
reality. As a classical philologist, he had long known of Plato’s belief that madness
for philosophers was superior to a normal mind (Phaedrus) and Nietzsche
repeatedly dwelled on the subject in his books. The desire to assert himself
through madness must have been very great. For all these reasons and the ones discussed
above, it is the judgment of this writer that Nietzsche deliberately willed himself
into a state of madness. He finally crossed his Rubicon.

The question may arise whether any person is able to will himself into a state
of permanent madness, not merely into a transient frenzy or temporary loss of
contact with the ‘real’ world. The conventional current psychiatric view is that
unknown origin chronic psychoses (‘madness’) are due to an abnormal brain
physiology that involuntarily affects a person’s mind. Just ‘willing’ oneself into
lifelong madness is not ordinarily regarded as a possible clinical phenomenon.
However, Nietzsche was not an ordinary person. The psychiatrist-philosopher
Karl Jaspers who published a thick tome about him (Nietzsche: Introduction to the
Understanding of his Philosophical Activity) commented there was only one Nietzsche
and there will never be another like him. Anything could be possible for the unique individual that was Friedrich Nietzsche.

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The translations into English in this essay, if not otherwise stated, are by the author.


On the Blissful Islands with Nietzsche and Jung—Paul Bishop

Peter S. Groff

The author of this unusual and fascinating monograph is an intellectual historian whose interests extend well beyond Nietzsche to encompass Weimar classicism, 20th century analytical psychology and classical Greek and Hellenistic philosophy. Although this may at first sound like a strange juxtaposition, Bishop’s previous studies have made a compelling case that vital aspects of Nietzsche’s thought come sharply into focus when he is read in relation to figures such as Goethe and Schiller on the one hand and Jung on the other, with an eye to certain formative themes and metaphors in the Platonic tradition. What we find when we set these thinkers in dialogue with one another is a distinct intellectual-spiritual lineage predominantly concerned with the possibilities of self-transformation.

Bishop’s interpretative approach is perhaps closest to Pierre Hadot in this respect, albeit more oriented towards modern German thought and uniquely informed by Jungian depth psychology.

His latest book, On the Blissful Islands with Nietzsche and Jung, demonstrates effectively the kind of rich and resonant Nietzsche interpretation that can come from such a catholic approach.1 The exegetical scope of the study would initially appear rather modest, focusing on a short passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which occurs at the end of the speech entitled “On the Blissful Islands”:

Ah, you men, I see an image sleeping in the stone, the image of my visions! Ah that it must sleep in the hardest, ugliest stone!

Now my hammer rages fiercely against its prison. Fragments fly from the stone: what is that to me?

1 It should be noted that this book is just as much a study of Jung as it is a study of Nietzsche. I focus here primarily on the latter, however, given the specific context of the review.
I will complete it: for a shadow came to me—the most silent, the lightest of all things once came to me!

The beauty of the Superman came to me as a shadow. Ah, my brothers! What are the gods to me now! (Z II.2)

Bishop pays especially close attention to a number of ideas here: the classical myth of the Blissful Islands, the soteriological function of the statue and project of (self-)sculpting, the protean metaphor of the shadow, the beautiful but elusive ideal of the Superman. In order to elucidate them he provides a “comparative, associationist, and amplificatory” reading à la Jung (xx), which gradually winds its way through a staggeringly wide range of intertexts: the Torah, the New Testament, various Platonic dialogues, a healthy slab of Neoplatonic treatises, works of Patristic theology and medieval Christian mysticism, an assortment of Gnostic, Hermetic, Kabbalistic and alchemical texts, select poems by Schiller and Goethe, Jung’s voluminous psychological studies (including his five year-long seminar on Zarathustra), and a smattering of twentieth-century philosophers (Bergson, Klages, Cassirer, etc). Bishop’s premise is not that Nietzsche somehow had all this neatly in mind as he composed Zarathustra: while there are obvious references to the Bible, Plato, Schiller and Goethe, it’s safe to say he was entirely unfamiliar many of these texts. Rather, the idea seems to be that some of the most powerful themes, images and metaphors of that book can be traced back through various strands of the tradition and have a kind of logic of their own that is reactivated in Nietzsche’s writing, regardless of his presumed intentions. In this way, Bishop ensnares Nietzsche with dozens of fine literary threads and pulls him back into close dialogue with ways of thinking and living that he is usually believed to have repudiated—and that contemporary philosophy is typically supposed to have left behind.

The first chapter, “On the Blissful Islands: In the Shadow of the Superman” focuses on Zarathustra’s puzzling assertion that “[t]he beauty of the Superman came to me as a shadow.” Why a shadow? What is the significance of that image? Bishop’s initial attempt at an answer unfolds into a sprawling, nearly 80 page-long consideration of this symbol across multiple texts and traditions. He surveys the significance of the shadow throughout ancient Greek cultures and provides a fascinating treatment of comparable imagery in the Judeo-Christian tradition.

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2 Bishop employs R. J. Hollingdale’s 1969 translation, which for all its strengths is arguably a bit dated. For the sake of simplicity, however, I will abide by those translation choices here.
from the “overshadowing” of Mary in the Annunciation to the darkness associated with God in Torahic theophanies and mystical texts (a function, ultimately, of God’s brilliant ontological radiance). Figuring most prominently in this discussion, however, is Jung’s archetypal notion of the shadow as the ‘dark’ aspect of one’s self: the seemingly inferior, worthless, repressed or rejected characteristics that one cannot acknowledge or affirm, and which consequently reemerge as projected demonizations of the other. While Jung identifies in Nietzsche’s thought (as well as Freud’s) a refreshing willingness to recognize the “black substance” out of which all radiant things must necessarily emerge, he suggests that Zarathustra struggles to affirm his own shadow and thus repeatedly externalizes it (he interprets the parade of grotesque characters one finds there—the fire-dog, the Soothsayer, the Dwarf, the black snake, the Ape, the Ugliest Man, etc—as products of Zarathustra’s shadow-forming process). And of course, one can see Nietzsche himself struggle with this through his doctrine of *amor fati*: “to see as beautiful what is necessary in things” (GS 276). On this account, as long as the self refuses to bring all parts of itself together, even its imperfections, shortcomings and humiliating inadequacies (“the enemy . . . in [one’s] own heart,” as Jung aptly puts it), it cannot achieve wholeness. Bishop clearly traces this idea back through German classicism to Neoplatonic aesthetics, emphasizing the essential connection between beauty and totality. Along the way, he examines some interesting subsidiary anticipations of Jung’s complementaristic vision, e.g. in the 16th century alchemical text *Rosarium philosophorum* and Goethe’s pivotal poem “Blessed Yearning” (*Selige Sehnsucht*).

Taken as a whole, this first lengthy chapter is a remarkable display of scholarly attentiveness and crackles with suggestive associations. Yet one can’t help but wonder what the punchline is. Bishop points out in the conclusion that “Nietzsche’s imagery in ‘On the Blissful Islands’ is extraordinarily rich in its intertextual and iconographic references and there are enormous associations at play when we read that the Superman came to Zarathustra as a shadow” (62). Surely this has been well demonstrated, but the original question hasn’t ultimately been addressed: why does the beauty of the Superman come to Zarathustra as a shadow?

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3 Jung is more circumspect about identifying the Shadow himself (IV.9) as one of Zarathustra’s shadows. Although Bishop offers a lengthy Jungian analysis of the Ugliest Man (Z IV.7), he does not have much to say here about the last human being (Z P.4) or the small human being (Z III.13.2), but affirmation of such realities would presumably be a necessary condition for the “completion” of the human being as Übergemensch (see Bishop, 10-13).
Instead of answering it—perhaps by concisely synthesizing the aforementioned play of associations—Bishop closes out the chapter by continuing to tease out and elaborate upon contrasting metaphors and themes. The reader is thus left with a superabundance of intriguing literary and philosophical resonances, but no clear sense of how they might illuminate the passage in question.

Chapter 2 is more fully realized. Titled after Plotinus’ famous precept, “Never cease chiseling your statue” (Enneads, I.6.9), it focuses on the central image of Z II.2: Zarathustra as sculptor, liberating the Superman from the hard, ugly stone of humanity. Here Bishop takes a close look at the metaphors of sculpting and the statue in Greco-Roman philosophy and the Judeo-Christian religious traditions, tracing the image up through the Renaissance, Enlightenment, and Weimar Classicism to Nietzsche and beyond. Interestingly, there is initially more resistance to the idea of the statue in the Judeo-Christian tradition, due to the Mosaic prohibition against graven images (rooted, arguably, in the transcendence and thus imperceptibility of God; cf. the theme of darkness mentioned above). While in some Presocratic thought there is a comparable hesitancy about attempting to represent the divine, pagan Greek thought generally exhibits a more positive attitude toward the theurgic and moral functions of the statue. As Bishop points out, “over time [its] significance shifts and the statue becomes an exemplar, not so much of idolatry, as of autonomous creativity” (93). His grouped discussion of Seneca, Plotinus, Gregory of Nyssa, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Meister Eckhart is particularly illuminating in this respect: we see an increasing concern with the sculpting or fashioning of the self (which Nietzsche will enthusiastically retrieve) and the Neoplatonic influence on Christian thinkers leads them to conceive of prophets and even God as a sculptor of human beings (96-97). The Neoplatonic conception of sculpting as a kind of purification, clearing aside or taking away remains influential through the Renaissance period, epitomized by Michelangelo’s famous remark, “I saw the angel in the marble and carved him until I set him free.” All this provides a useful background against which to read Nietzsche’s own ambitious language of sculpting (both of self and other, as well as individual and type).

Bishop does a fine job of interrogating the salient passages and he is well-attuned to the radically different axiological and ontological commitments that underlie Nietzsche and the Neoplatonists’ respective projects. But I wonder

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4 Bishop surveys the obligatory passages alongside Z II.2 (BT 1, KSA 9:7[213], Z II.20, BGE 225), as well as some less familiar but very suggestive ones (HH 258, AOM 172, GS 12, EH, “Wise,” 2), although he does omit a couple of crucial ones (GS 290, BGE 62).
whether the question of human self-sculpture in the aftermath of the death of God might be brought even more sharply into focus by explicitly considering the Platonic ideal of *homoiosis theōi* (becoming like god), which seems to hover in the background of much of the early philosophical sculpture literature. The theme is enormously important in Greek and Hellenistic philosophy and it gets taken up and thought through quite thoroughly in an Abrahamic context by a host of Islamic and Jewish thinkers during the medieval period. It might prove a useful foil for understanding the inherent tensions in Zarathustra’s experimental cultivation of the Superman, since (1) he adopts and retains the Neoplatonic assumption that sculpting is essentially removal of the inessential, yet (2) there is no preexisting paradigm or *telos* to be discovered or revealed, and (3) he speaks both here and elsewhere of the “completion” or “perfection” (*Vollkommenheit*) of the human being. Be that as it may, we are deeply indebted to Bishop for having explored the motif of self-sculpture so thoroughly, and one’s reading of *Zarathustra* (and Nietzsche’s corpus in general) cannot but be much richer as a result of it.

At the very end of Chapter 2, Bishop observes that the appeal to embark on a path of self-transformation implies dissatisfaction with the current shape of things. “But does wanting something else—or wanting something better—imply one believes there can actually be something better?” he asks, “Or that there is something one could call the best? Does it imply one believes in something that might be called—the *ideal* . . . ?” (129). This question sets the stage for Chapter 3, which attempts to synthesize the shadow and sculpting themes. Bishop approaches this through a close reading of Schiller’s poem “The Ideal and Life” (*Das Ideal und das Leben*), which attends to its developmental history as well as its thematic relation to a projected (albeit unwritten) subsequent poem on Heracles’ arrival, divine transfiguration and joyful blessedness in Olympus. The central theme of the poem, which Bishop brings to bear on *Zarathustra*, is the perpetual accessibility of the ideal amidst the struggle and strife of life, via both intellectual contemplation and aesthetic creativity. While this may at first seem like an escapist fantasy, he emphasizes the ideal’s capacity to invigorate and transform life in the here and now. The transfiguration of the present moment by means of “the eternal within,” he calls it, leads into an extended reflection on the meaning of the Blissful Islands (*glückseligen Inseln*).

This is a welcome contribution to the literature, since the theme of the Blissful Islands in *Zarathustra* has not as yet received any sustained treatment. Bishop lays the groundwork for his discussion in the opening section of Chapter 1, where he
examines its roots in classical Greek myth as the place of the heroic dead and traces the idea in its various permutations through Hesiod, Homer, Pindar, Plato, Virgil, Plutarch, Pliny the Elder and the 6th c. Neoplatonist Olympiodorus. Often conceived as a paradisiacal afterlife, sometimes as an actual place in the world where life is easiest and best, the Blissful Islands represent the idyllic possibility of genuine blessedness or happiness. In Chapter 3, Bishop fuses this with the invigorating and transformative capacity of the ideal in the midst of life and finds in Schiller and Nietzsche an “insistence on the possibility, in the here-and-now, of happiness or joy” (172). Ultimately, the Blissful Islands are “[e]xactly where you are right now”—hence Zarathustra’s insistence in Z IV.2 that “There are still Blissful Islands!” (173). Wherever one is, there is always the possibility of joy, or put differently, the manifestation of eternity, completeness and perfection in the present moment.

Bishop’s consideration of this theme in Nietzsche is rewarding, even inspiring, and I have to admire any scholar who can work a good Laurie Anderson quote into a discussion of Nietzsche, Schiller, and Greek myth (173). But there are several stones still left unturned here. For the Blissful Islands, at least in Zarathustra, constitute an actual place. Why do Zarathustra’s friends leave the Motley Cow to take up residence there in Z II.1? Why does Zarathustra abandon them in Z II.22? Why does the Soothsayer claim in Z IV.2 that “there are no Blissful Islands anymore”? Why are there multiple rejected drafts in the Nachlass that intimate the sinking and destruction of the Blissful Islands? One is tempted here to consult biographical details: for instance, Nietzsche’s admission to Peter Gast that Zarathustra’s Blissful Islands were inspired by Ischia, an island in the Gulf of Naples, or his mourning of their destruction in the summer 1883. Even then, though, their philosophical significance in the context of Zarathustra remains unclear. My own view is that the Blissful Islands represent a kind of Epicurean friendship community that captures in nuce Nietzsche’s own shift from the more modest project of private self-cultivation exemplified in his middle works to the nomothetic (and markedly Platonic) ambitions of Zarathustra and his later period. I also think a closer attention to the language of ‘blessedness’ in the Greek and German traditions generally and Zarathustra specifically (makariotēs, Seligkeit,

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5 Zarathustra himself offers multiple rationales in Z II.22, III.1, III.3; cf. Z II.9 and KSA 10:16[89].

6 Bishop acknowledges these facts but doesn’t bring them to bear on his interpretation of the text (4-5). For a more detailed biographical discussion of the significance of Ischia for Nietzsche, see Paolo D’Iorio, *Nietzsche’s Journey to Sorrento: Genesis of the Philosophy of the Free Spirit* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2016).
Glückseligkeit, etc) would have been constructive. But Bishop’s take on this theme is resourceful and thought-provoking, and it has certainly fine-tuned the way I think about it.

The fourth and final chapter of the book begins by surveying Platonic, Nietzschean and Jungian attitudes towards the body. Bishop offers a nuanced and sympathetic reading of select Platonic and Neoplatonic texts that undermines the usual assumption that they are anti-body. Similarly, a historical-developmental examination of the concept of spirit (Geist) complicates Nietzsche’s materialism. But the heart of the chapter is a sustained reflection on the relation between asceticism and ecstasy. Bishop quickly moves beyond the usual two-dimensional platitudes about Nietzsche’s critique of the ascetic ideal to examine his subtler and more ambivalent attitude towards spiritual exercises. By situating Zarathustra’s ecstatic experiences of dancing, ascent and celebratory world-affirmation (as well as some of Nietzsche’s more confessional passages) against the background of ascetic practices, Bishop offers us a portrait of Nietzsche as a ‘mystic’ or initiate of sorts, which I find both compelling and plausible (setting aside the simplistic modern caricatures that have obscured the original meanings of that term). The book winds down with a discussion of some other affinities between the Nietzschean and Platonic worldview (e.g., the centrality of hierarchy and the idea of the world as ‘perfect’) and concludes with one last elegant reflection on the significance of the Blissful Islands.

There are respects in which Bishop’s book is unusual, and some may take exception to the liberties he allows himself. The “comparative, associationist, and amplificatory” approach to texts that he employs here can be exciting and suggestive, but also occasionally scattershot, slippery and exhausting. And Jung, from whom Bishop derives this hermeneutic strategy, has for some time had a checkered reputation in academia (both in the social sciences and the humanities).

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7 As Bishop points out, the question of the relation between asceticism and ecstasy was one of the things that led Jung to part ways with Freud (192).


9 On a more picayune note, I encountered a number of citational inconsistencies and repetitions, as well as a few references to The Will to Power which ought instead to have been to the KSA. But minor flaws like this are simply attributable to sloppy editorial oversight at Routledge.
I set aside the question whether this is entirely justified, but will say that I find Bishop’s inclusive attitude refreshing and am glad to see Jung discussed in responsible scholarly contexts, placed in relation to thinkers such as Nietzsche, Schiller, Goethe and Plotinus and embraced as a significant moment in the lineage of modern German thought. Similarly, I admired Bishop’s ability to set Nietzsche in productive dialogue with these thinkers about abiding practical concerns that bear on the art of living. Those whose tastes lean towards reconstructions of Nietzsche’s thought into some contemporary ‘ism’ may find this book inadequately systematic. Those who insist on rigorous historical contextualization of Nietzsche’s thought and enumerating precisely what he did or didn’t read may find it too loose and speculative. I myself found it fascinating and stimulating. I very much appreciated the broad historical scope, the generous engagement with liminally philosophical texts, and the practical emphasis self-sculpting and transformation. In the spirit of both Goethe and Nietzsche, this is a book that does not merely aim to instruct, but also to augment and invigorate one’s activity.
*I am Dynamite!* —Sue Prideaux


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Brian Pines

Those familiar with the Julian Young, Curtis Cate, Walter Kaufmann, R.J. Hollingdale, Rüdiger Safranski, and Ronald Hayman biographies of Nietzsche open Sue Prideaux’s nearly four hundred page *I am Dynamite!* with skeptical curiosity: has Prideaux discovered anything to say about Nietzsche’s life that we have not already learned?

While the biography is certainly accessible enough to be enjoyed by Nietzsche novices, it is also filled with clues and riddles sure to intrigue those who have spent many years reading him. Take for instance Prideaux’s discussion of the young Nietzsche’s “paltry marks for mathematics, in which his interest remained faint” to which she adds almost as an afterthought, “apart from a brief period when he became fascinated by the properties of the circle” (p.29)—foreshadowing his postulation of the Eternal Recurrence. The book is rife with similar such small, but insightful minutiae, like her conjecture that despite Nietzsche’s famous mountaineering spirit, he did not often make it to the highest altitudes on account of his extreme sensitivity to light: the sun’s reflection off the snow would have blinded him.

One of the most charming aspects of *I am Dynamite!* is the penchant for the coincidental that Prideaux shares with Nietzsche. Her taste for exploring the accidents of fate within her subject’s life impels her to find meaning in Nietzsche's presence in Venice during the time Arnold Böcklin was painting *The Island of the Dead*. She details the superstitions that surrounded the mountains Nietzsche climbed with Wagner and Salomé, and she describes the layout and history of the cities where Nietzsche felt at home. Her descriptions of the multi-layered coincidences of Nietzsche’s life story help us to envision the nuances of the fate he entreated himself to love.

Prideaux does an excellent job of articulating and addressing issues that fall within the scope of biographical explanation. For instance, she frames the question of the origins of Nietzsche’s aphoristic style beautifully, discussing a
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confluence of influences, from Empedocles and Holderlin to Paul Rée. However, Prideaux ultimately weighs in on the side of a practical and physiological explanation: his style was a necessity of his illness, “the only way he was capable of recording the bursts of significant thought between headaches” (p.184). Although previous biographies have provided detailed treatments on the matter of Nietzsche’s suffering, *I am Dynamite!* displays it with a rich physicality that keep the reader meditating on the presence of the illness that played a constitutive part of Nietzsche’s life and work.

Unlike Safranski and Young, Prideaux does not attempt to write a philosophical biography. She devotes relatively few pages to expositions of Nietzsche’s thought. Likewise her book does not aim to be as comprehensive as Cate’s. There are whole years to which she gives only a cursory glance (1886-1888 receives just thirteen pages of attention). She touches on, but does not dwell upon, the Oedipal nature of Nietzsche’s love for the Wagners. All these themes have already been well explored. The point upon which Prideaux surpasses previous biographers is in her attunement to the emotional life of Nietzsche. Her careful observation of Nietzsche’s habits and his moods, her speculation upon their changes and origins, is the strongest aspect of *I am Dynamite!* Prideaux’s biography does the difficult work of portraying the complexity of Nietzsche’s anxiety and pain, the intensity of his desire and aspirations, and thereby helps us feel closer than ever before to Nietzsche as he lived and breathed. Prideaux’s previous work in biographies on the lives of Edvard Munch and August Strindberg, and her extensive research into the social etiquette and discontents of the late 19th century, contributes an impressive background which shapes her inquiry.

A detailed account like Prideaux’s of Nietzsche’s emotional odyssey is an eminently worthwhile project. To explore what Nietzsche was feeling would be one of the most genuine ways to write about the thinker on his own terms. Nietzsche would be the first to assert that his philosophical battles with Christianity, with Wagner, and with modernity were ultimately shaped by aspects of his emotional life. “Thoughts are the shadows of our feelings—always darker, emptier, simpler” (GS §179). Prideaux helps to emphasize that, due in large part to his extraordinary illness, Nietzsche had a deeper affective understanding of these problems than previous philosophers.

The biography’s emotionally oriented narrative does lead to an occasional tendency towards exaggeration. For instance on p.311 Prideaux states that Nietzsche “had no companions during his time in Turin. Not even any visitors.” While the overall point Prideaux is makes is an important one—that Nietzsche established for himself a genuine sense of urban solitude in Turin—it is not quite accurate to say he did not have any company. He did at least become acquainted
with Pasquale D’Ercole, a professor at the University of Turin who shared many of his interests on matters of religion and the East. Nietzsche would write to D’Ercole before anyone else upon his arrival in Sils-Maria for the summer of 1888 (KGB III.5, p.326-7). Whether such intermittent exaggerations are serious impediments of this work is for the reader to decide. The wider impression the book gives is that Prideaux does quite an impressive job combining diligent scholarship with a spirited and imaginative writing style.

Prideaux’s biography has the added dividend of following the story of Nietzsche’s sister, and the development of the Nietzsche legend. Prideaux’s observations concerning Elisabeth are imbued with a venomous humor. She illustrates with clarity and color Elisabeth’s shameless efforts to exploit first the colonists of Nueva Germania (the ‘racially pure’ colony she founded in Paraguay), and then her brother’s legacy. She conveys the inherent narcissism which motivated Elisabeth to portray Nietzsche as a living god, and to enlarge her own importance as his Pythia. Prideaux’s judgments are sometimes sharp and witty, such as her characterization of one of Elisabeth's vacation letters: “Unfortunately, Von Moltke caught a cold while taking a trip on the lake. ‘To the general dismay of all our party, [he] died,’ Elisabeth noted, but this did not long dent her cheeriness; ‘What happy and cloudless days were these three weeks in Lugano!’” (p.87). At other times she is appropriately damning of Nietzsche’s sister, likening her and her entourage to the tarantulas Nietzsche employed as a motif in Zarathustra. Most who are familiar with how much work was required to revive Nietzsche’s reputation after Elisabeth’s distortions will not feel Prideaux unjustified in her passionate assessments. There are even a few unsent drafts of letters Nietzsche wrote to his sister (KGB III.5, p.218-20; p.237-8) in which he himself condemns Elisabeth with surprising malice, designating her as “superfluous,” informing her that “the hair-raising idea came to me that you have understood nothing, nothing of my illness,” and calling her his “former sister.”

It is rare to find a scholar who writes a biography so aligned in terms of style with what their subject would have wished. Genius may necessitate at least a little madness, and Prideaux beautifully captures something of both, giving us an intimate and unique take on the Nietzsche legend.
Europa im Geisterkrieg. Studien zu Nietzsche—Werner Stegmaier

Michael Steinmann

For those familiar with the German-speaking academic world, Werner Stegmaier is one of the most eminent Nietzsche scholars. Throughout his many articles and books, he has developed a unique approach that combines what at first glance may seem disparate ways of reading Nietzsche. On the one hand, Stegmaier takes Nietzsche seriously as a philosopher and interprets him in a “nüchtern”, that is, sober and argument-based way (41, footnote). On the other hand, he pays crucial attention to the literary and contextual character of Nietzsche’s work. The results of this approach are as rich in detail as Nietzsche’s own texts and yet remain able to delineate significant philosophical insights. As a recent example, Stegmaier has provided an over 600-page long interpretation of Book Five of Beyond Good and Evil, which undoubtedly sets as a high standard for all analyses that want to follow the context in which Nietzsche’s thoughts are articulated.¹

An equally voluminous collection of Stegmaier’s articles is now available in an online book edited by Andrea C. Bertino: “Europa im Geisterkrieg. Studien zu Nietzsche” (Open Book Publishers, 2018). The texts gathered in this volume cover three decades of Stegmaier’s work, ranging from 1985 to 2016. As the editor rightly points out, from the 21 articles gathered in the volume emerges no less than an interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought as a whole (VII). The collection is a valuable resource for Nietzsche scholars. It was made possible by an EU-funded project to create open access monographies.

The title of the collection elides an easy translation. “Europe During the War of Spirits” may be one way to render it in English. According to Stegmaier, the title refers to the “dramatic” conditions under which Nietzsche has to be interpreted (4). Modernity is for Stegmaier a time of “fluctuance” in which all certainties and all substantial values, especially those values grounded in reason,

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have been lost (2). Humans now need to provide anew an “orientation of the world” (8). An ‘orientation’ is an always-fragile direction of thought and practice that has to be found when there are precisely no more established ways that can be followed (cf. 12). Nietzsche, in his reflection on modern nihilism and the crumbling foundations of culture, has undoubtedly contributed to this “war of spirits.” The results of his thinking, however, are not only negative. Stegmaier wants to show “how Nietzsche’s thinking can liberate the present time to develop uninhibited and productive approaches to nihilism.” (2) The title of the collection, however, is “risky” (4), he admits, and one has to agree. Not only does it evoke the often ambiguous fascination with war in Nietzsche’s later works (the term Geisterkrieg can be found in Ecce Homo, Why I Am a Fatality, 1). It also limits the scope of his thinking to the European context, despite Nietzsche’s own intention to concern “humanity as a whole” (ibid.). Nihilism has certainly a global dimension, but the title of the collection seems to point rather backwards, to a time when the main focus of a European thinker was in fact Europe alone. It does not indicate the importance of Nietzsche’s thought for the future. Stegmaier’s claim that “Europe was mostly open for other cultures” seems strangely oblivious of the dynamics of cultural colonialism (ibid.). Perhaps it is his intention to show Nietzsche’s philosophy as an antidote to the vicious political nihilism that currently plagues the European sub-continent. But even Europe’s problems seem to require a global perspective in order to be properly understood, or so one could argue.


In the temporalization of philosophy, Stegmaier sees a crucial characteristic not only of Nietzsche’s work, but of modern philosophy as a whole. He develops Nietzsche’s philosophical argument systematically and shows that they belong to a broader tradition, despite Nietzsche’s own tendency to describe himself as an isolated figure, disconnected from the previous history of philosophy. Stegmaier argues convincingly that Nietzsche is part of the development of German

2 All translations of the German original by M.S.
philosophy and can be discussed in conjunction with Hegel (78-9) and Dilthey (66). But he also takes the seemingly poetic aspects of Nietzsche’s work seriously, especially Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Speaking about Zarathustra’s anti-doctrines does not mean that the work is without philosophical content. Insofar as the anti-doctrines do not lead to general or generally applicable statement, they force the reader to consider the singularity of temporal experience. In addition, Stegmaier provides an analysis of Nietzsche’s philosophy of emotions and addresses the difficult topic of his relationships to the Jews. Despite his “anti-antisemitism” (422), Nietzsche sees the Jews as strangers in Europe and cannot appreciate their own perspective (446). Other articles appear of lesser systematic interest, especially those related to 19th-century ideas of culture. Nietzsche’s use of notions like greatness and measuredness (Maß) have not aged as well as Stegmaier seems to believe and can hardly be of relevance beyond the context of his work.

Stegmaier provides a careful account of Nietzsche’s idea of perspectivism. He develops this account based on the relation between generality and individuality. The point is not simply to replace generality with individuality, because there is no purely individual perspective on the world that is not at the same time determined in a generalizable way (66). True individuality rather emerges at the intersection of the general and individual; it emerges through the opening of new insights and the overcoming of oneself, which has to be understood in the twofold sense of overpowering and passing beyond one’s own perspectives (68). Individual life must remain a mystery to itself, otherwise it is no individual life. This tension in the very notion of the individual makes it necessary to “temporallize” truth and untruth in individual life. (298) Humans progress from one to the other and back. This also means that philosophy still has to be seen as desire for truth, even if it has to deny itself the achievement of definite truths (70). Stegmaier shows that perspectivism can only be understood as a paradox, not as doctrine, and is ultimately based in a movement of thought which cannot lead to stable, universalizable insights.

One can see in this interpretation an elegant solution to the notorious problem of self-application. If perspectivism is accused of being self-refuting, one only conceives of it as logical problem. The real problem, for Nietzsche, lies in the restraint from, or the ironic distance toward insights that are found. How does one experience, how does one live with the renunciation of truth, while desiring it at the same time? Stegmaier’s analysis of Zarathustra further illuminates this point. For him, the overhuman is no general notion, which would point at another kind of human beings, but rather the expression of the overcoming of the very notion of a human being (287). Likewise, Stegmaier shows the idea of eternal recurrence fails and that its meaning lies precisely in this failure (120). The idea
fails because the overcoming of all goals and representations, which in itself would be a-temporal (everything returns and therefore everything always stays the same), can only be pictured through the succession of time. The idea also refutes itself, because if everything comes back, then one cannot know it, otherwise a different state would come back every time (293). Stegmaier’s emphasis on the paradoxical meaning of Nietzsche’s ideas is opposed to more systematizing approaches. In contrast to Günter Abel, for example, Stegmaier avoids the abstract terminology of Nietzsche’s late notebooks and relies on the more literary published works. As he urges the reader to consider the individual experience of becoming, he also urges her to consider the individual contexts in which such experiences are expressed. Renouncing the temptation to extract another formalistic ‘theory’ from Nietzsche’s works is a major contribution of his study.

Zarathustra shows that perspectivism is closely linked to the temporalization of philosophy. For Stegmaier, temporalization does not mean that philosophy thinks about time but that it considers the inherent temporality of thoughts and ideas (94). For Nietzsche, time is as fundamental as it is for Heidegger, Stegmaier claims (121). The inherent temporality of thoughts can be captured in tropes like the noon. Tropes like this entail “no calculating of what always stays the same, repeats itself regularly, or is finally completed, but the acceptance of incalculable things, life with surprising things, the affirmation of right times and times that may not be right, including situations in which things appear ‘at a bad time’” (102-3). This way, time has its own measure of what is appropriate for human life. The idea of an event occurring at the “right time,” for example, refers to “the incommensurable time of individuals and their worlds” (120). This means, again, that genuine individuality cannot be captured through yet another general notion but depends on an uncontrollable temporal experience. In the English-speaking literature, one can only think of Nehamas as a Nietzsche scholar who has taken the problem of individuality seriously to the same degree.

Stegmaier has also done important work on Nietzsche’s relation to Darwinism. There, he looks past Nietzsche’s own polemic. His detailed interpretation shows that Nietzsche is eventually more in line with Darwin than he himself assumed (136). Insofar as evolution entails only a probabilistic account of causality, it understands life based on individual processes. Nietzsche conceives of the will to power as embedded in deeply individual processes, which “like the selective processes of evolutionary biology follow only their own necessity, which in turn results from the respective circumstances and cannot be captured in general terms” (151). For Stegmaier, this understanding of biological life is “the final thought of Darwin’s theory of evolution” of which “Nietzsche’s philosophy is the deepest interpretation” (ibid.). Darwin gave up the idea of fixed species,
which then implies that organic beings are nothing but an ever-changing realm of individual beings (181). In other words, Darwin’s account of evolution also allows for a radically temporal conception of the organic world (182). The difference between this interpretation of Darwin and Nietzsche’s own polemic can then perhaps be explained by a certain misunderstanding of natural selection as a mechanical, purely utilitarian process. As Stegmaier has it, Nietzsche did not realize that it constitutes an open and indeterminate development.

Stegmaier’s contributions to Nietzsche’s ethics seem less pertinent than his reflections on the impact of time on philosophical thought. He defines ethics as freedom from particular moralities (388). Morality, for Stegmaier, provides orientation through specific norms, while ethics requires us to renounce the reliance on any leading norm. This way, the distinction between master and slave morality made by Nietzsche is interpreted without his violent anti-egalitarianism, as expressing a rather tolerant and pluralistic attitude toward the variety of possible moralities. In his own ethics, Nietzsche avoids the attribution of guilt to others (412) and recommends nobility as an attitude of generosity and hospitality (413). Nietzsche also allows for a distinction between power and violence, Stegmaier points out (416, footnote).

Highlighting the elements of moral pluralism in Nietzsche is no doubt important. One can, however, suspect this pluralistic interpretation of being too harmonious at the end. It seems to neglect the more dramatic truth-finding that Nietzsche describes, among others, as a process of illness and healing. For example, the nobility of the “sovereign individual” is one that is found in solitude alone, far from the consideration of the validity of the opinions of others, and with the constant risk of losing it again. Pluralism, in other words, is based less on the coexistence than on the antagonism of value systems in Nietzsche, and this aspect seems to be undervalued in Stegmaier’s work. A similar conclusion can be drawn from his emphasis on orientation as a means to deal with the openness of modern society: “Orientation nowhere has something firm to hold on to, it doesn’t know anything firm, but it also doesn’t need anything to hold on to. Quite to the contrary, it functions based on reference points, which lead to further reference points. Orientation turns everything into signs that refer to other signs” (175). The philosophy of orientation, at the end, seems to take the painful contradictions out of modern life, which is as much characterized by one’s being without any orientation than by the ability to find a reliable one. Often times, the “reference points” that are found are but traces of what has been lost.\footnote{A similar point is made in Johnson’s review, see above.} This means that if we use Nietzsche in order to cope with nihilism, as Stegmaier
suggests, we risk losing sight of the very impact of nihilism on life. Stegmaier’s interpretation seems to have had its own “right time” in the Germany of the 80s and 90s, which could be seen as a time of peaceful democratic achievements and productive pluralism. How would an interpretation of Nietzsche in the current age of unexpected and spiteful social fractures look like?
Biographies of Contributors

Peter S. Groff is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Bucknell University. He has written on Nietzsche, Islamic philosophy and comparative questions across traditions. His most recent scholarship focuses on cultivating an intercultural polylogue of sorts between Nietzsche, select classical Islamic philosophers and certain Greek and Hellenistic sources regarding philosophy as a way of life.

Andrew Johnson is finishing his PhD in Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His major field is in political theory, secondary fields are in international relations and American politics, has an emphasis in Global Studies and sometimes teaches for the Black Studies department. Andrew has an MA in Philosophy from Louisiana State University and a BA in Philosophy from the University of Maine. His dissertation explores the historical formation, development, and evolution of police institutions.

Juliano C. S. Neves received his Ph.D. in physics at the University of São Paulo, Brazil, and is currently a post-doc at the Federal University of ABC, Brazil. His interests in physics are black holes, cosmology, and quantum field theory. In physics, the author has studied regular, or non-singular, solutions in both gravitation and cosmology, also called regular black holes and bouncing cosmologies, respectively. In philosophy, his interests are Nietzschean philosophy and philosophy of science.

Brian Pines currently teaches philosophy at Monterey Peninsula College, he is the editor of Understanding Nietzsche, Understanding Modernism, published in February of 2019. His research interests lie at the intersection of philosophy, literature, and history.

Richard Schain, Independent Philosopher, in a former life, trained in neurology and psychiatry at the Yale-New Haven Medical Center. Subsequently he served as professor of neurology and psychiatry at UCLA (1967-1982). Since that time he has been active as an independent philosopher (like Nietzsche). Currently, his wife and he divide their time between Sonoita, AZ and Alamos, Mexico. His recent publications are Landesman’s Journal: Meditations of a Forest Philosopher (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2016); The Art Form Known as Philosophy (Confrontation: Literary Magazine, 122: 142-154, 2017); Philosophical Artwork II

**Michael Steinmann**, Professor of Philosophy at Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken, New Jersey. Before coming to the United States, he received his Ph.D. at the University of Tübingen and his Habilitation at the University of Freiburg. Steinmann is interested in questions of phenomenology, hermeneutics, and ethics. Selected books: *The Ethics of Friedrich Nietzsche* (de Gruyter, 2000), *The Openness of Meaning. Investigations on Language and Logic in Martin Heidegger* (Mohr Siebeck, 2008). Recent articles focus on Nietzsche’s aesthetic interpretation of life, his understanding of illness and health, and his relation to transhumanism.
Nietzsche on Affects

In his notes, Nietzsche remarks that “Under every thought there is an affect [Affekt]. Every thought, every feeling, every will is not born from one particular drive, but an overall condition” (KSA 12: 2 [103]). Affects are described in *Dawn* as “inclinations” and “aversions [or disinclinations]” that influence one’s behavior (D 34). And indeed, throughout his work Nietzsche examines a wide variety of particular affects and their functions, analyzing the influence of affects such as pity, guilt, contempt, fear, honor, dishonor, pride, and cheerfulness. A number of Nietzsche scholars offer accounts of how affect functions broadly in Nietzsche. While some investigate the way in which affects create values or evaluative stances (Janaway, Katsafanas, Poellner), still others examine the way affects shape epistemic perspectives (Clark and Dudrick) and perceptual experience (Poellner) in Nietzsche. Yet the topic of affect in Nietzsche’s thought is still under-treated. Affects, for Nietzsche, not only shape thought and experience; they shape individuals. For example, in the criminal from *Twilight of the Idols*, physiological degeneration results when one’s “most lively drives [Trieben]… grow together with depressive affects [Affekten]” (TI, “Raids of an Untimely Man,” 45). Furthermore, the affects one experiences do not simply reflect or express some feature of an individual’s particular psychology; affects are communicated between and among individuals, and such communication always takes place in a norm-laden sociohistorical context. This interplay between individual, affect, and society is also under-treated.

For our issue, we welcome contributions from scholarly essays to artistic explorations on Nietzsche and affect. Possible topics include but are not limited to:

- Nietzsche on the function of affect or affects
- An investigation of an individual Nietzschean affect
- Affect and personal transformation in Nietzsche
- Affects and social being in Nietzsche
- Nietzsche and Spinoza on affect
- Intersections between Nietzsche’s thought and affect theory

To submit your work for review, please send an abstract of 500 words or a 500-word proposal of your suggested artwork to nceditors@nietzschecircle.com latest by July 1st. The final paper submission and final work submission deadline is October 1st. Please see the Submission Guidelines at http://agonist.nietzschecircle.com/wp/submission-policy.
Submission Guidelines

To be considered for publication in The Agonist we require:

• A page with your full name, your academic affiliation (if applicable), address, email, and phone number.
• A short summary (200-300 words) sent together with your work, indicating the topic of your submission.
• A 250-word bio, the length of your manuscript/submission, and a short list of prior publications.

Please use biographical listings of current contributors as models.

Essays should be between 3,000 and 5,000 words.

Contributors are expected to check all typographical issues, such as italicizing the titles of works of art, in the Word file. If there are issues regarding the appropriateness of the text, those matters will be discussed with the contributor. If there are proofing issues, the contributor will be notified to make the corrections. Submitted texts will not be altered by us. The Agonist does not return submitted manuscripts, accept unsolicited manuscripts, or consider manuscripts that are under review elsewhere or that have been previously published.

BOOK REVIEWS:
The Agonist accepts review copies of books on or related to Nietzsche (see About) and will seek reviewers to write on them. Book publishers interested in forwarding review copies can contact the editors at nceditors@nietzsche.com or you can use our contact form. Please submit initially a proposal for an essay, which must be original work by the submitting author. For further details, please see Submission Guidelines below. Any work received that does not follow the appropriate guidelines will not be read. If you have any questions with regard to our guidelines or submission policy, please contact us.

HOW TO SUBMIT:
The abstract (300 words maximum) and the submission should be sent to: nceditors@nietzsche.com. Once approved by the The Agonist Editorial Board, a deadline will be determined for the submission. The response time may
vary from 2-5 weeks, so please be patient.

SPECIFIC GUIDELINES:

1. *The Agonist* uses the *MLA style* (see [www.mla.org](http://www.mla.org)).

2. All submissions must be submitted as a double-spaced Word-document, using a point twelve TNR (12) font with 1” margins on all sides. For footnotes, please use point ten (10) font.

3. The paragraphs must be separated from each other; indent 5 spaces in the beginning of each paragraph.

4. Quotations that exceed three lines must be indented and separated from the body of the text into its own paragraph. The lengthy citations are also single-spaced, as are the footnotes.

5. Please note that page numbers go into the upper right hand corner with your last name.

6. Italics are to be used for author’s *emphases*, book and journal titles, and foreign terms.

7. Quotations from Nietzsche’s works should be followed in the main text by parenthetical references to the work in abbreviation followed by section or note numbers: e.g., *(BT §7), (GS §124), (GM III §7), (TI “Ancients” §3)*. For a complete list of standard abbreviations, see below. The translation being cited should be indicated in a footnote to the first quotation from the work. If the author is rendering Nietzsche’s German into English, each quotation should be footnoted with a reference to a standard critical German edition of Nietzsche’s works, preferably the KSA. All other scholarly references should be given in the footnotes.

8. In the case of essays on visual art, images and captions should be embedded in the text. Images and caption texts must be submitted both separately (on a separate cover sheet) and as the Word file in order to be prepared for publication.

9. In the case of essays on visual art, it is necessary for the contributor to obtain images and caption texts. Generally, these are available from galleries and museum press or public relations offices, along with the needed permissions.
10. Images must be at least 300 dpi, at a print scale sufficient to fit properly in a normal-sized PDF file. (8 1/2 by 11 inches—please see current The Agonist PDF files for examples of the scale.)

11. *The Agonist* does not offer compensation to contributors.

12. Copyright for all published texts will be held jointly by the contributor and *The Agonist*.

13. Manuscript submissions and all related materials and other correspondence should be sent to: nceeditors(at)nietzschecircle.com.

14. Books for review and all inquiries concerning books listed as received for review should be directed to the book editors.

**STANDARD ABBREVIATIONS:**
As noted above, references to Nietzsche’s writings are to be included in the body of the essay using the standard English title abbreviations indicated below. With reference to translations, Roman numerals denote a standard subdivision within a single work in which the sections are not numbered consecutively (e.g., On the Genealogy of Morals), Arabic numerals denote the section number rather than the page number, and “P” denotes Nietzsche’s Prefaces.

Unless the author is translating, the published translation used should be indicated with a footnote to the initial citation reference.
References to the editions by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari take the following forms:

*Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (KGW) (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967—) is cited by division number (Roman), followed by volume number (Arabic), followed by the fragment number.

*Kritische Studienausgabe* (KSA) (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980) is cited by volume number (Arabic) followed by the fragment number.

*Briefwechsel: Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (KGB) (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1975—) is cited by division number (Roman), followed by volume number (Arabic), followed by page number.

*Sämtliche Briefe: Kritische Studienausgabe* (KSB) (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986) is cited by
References to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* list the part number and chapter title, e.g., (Z: 4 “On Science”).

References to *Twilight of the Idols* and *Ecce Homo* list abbreviated chapter title and section number, e.g., (TI “Ancients” §3) or (EH “Books” BGE §2).

References to works in which sections are too long to be cited helpfully by section number should cite section number then page number, e.g., (SE §3, p. 142), with the translation/edition footnoted.

A = *The Antichrist*
AOM = *Assorted Opinions and Maxims*
BGE = *Beyond Good and Evil*
BT = *The Birth of Tragedy*
CW = *The Case of Wagner*
D = *Daybreak / Dawn*
DS = *David Strauss, the Writer and the Confessor*
EH = *Ecce Homo* [“Wise,” “Clever,” “Books,” “Destiny”]
FEI = “On the Future of our Educational Institutions”
GM = *On the Genealogy of Morals*
GOA = *Nietzsches Werke* (Grossoktavausgabe)
GS = *The Gay Science / Joyful Wisdom*
HS = “Homer’s Contest”
HCP = “Homer and Classical Philology”
HH = *Human, All Too Human*
HL = *On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life*
KGB = *Briefwechsel: Kritische Gesamtausgabe*
KGW = *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*
KSA = *Kritische Studienausgabe*
KSB = *Sämtliche Briefe: Kritische Studienausgabe*
LR = “Lectures on Rhetoric”
MA = *Nietzsches Gesammelte Werke* (Musarionausgabe)
NCW = *Nietzsche contra Wagner*
PPP = *Pre-Platonic Philosophers*
PTA = *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*
RWB = *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*
SE = *Schopenhauer as Educator*
= “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-moral Sense”
UM = Untimely Meditations / Thoughts Out of Season
WDB = Werke in drei Bänden (Ed. Karl Schlechta)
WP = The Will to Power
WPh = “We Philologists”
WS = The Wanderer and his Shadow
WLN = Writings from the Late Notebooks
Z = Thus Spoke Zarathustra